Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2007

National Security and Environmental Laws: A Clear and Present
Danger?
Hope M. Babcock
Georgetown University Law Center, babcock@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/953

25 Va. Envtl. L.J. 105-156 (2007)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Environmental Policy Commons,
Environmental Public Health Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law
Commons

ARTICLE

NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS: A
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER?
Hope Babcock*
I.

II.
III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION ........................................

106

NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTIONS UNDER EXISTING
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS ...............................

110

NON-ENVIRONMENTAL NATIONAL SECURITY
INITIATIVES - THE USA PATRIOT ACT .............

120

RELIEF FROM ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC

A. Exemptions from Environmental Laws ............
B. Constrainingthe Release of Public Information ...

125
126
136

V.

THESE CHANGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE LAWS ARE TROUBLING .................

146

VI.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF SEPTEMBER 11 Do NOT
WARRANT A ROLLBACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LAWS ............................

DISCLOSURE LAWS .....................................

VII.

CONCLUSION ...........................................

153
155

The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power
exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this
combination endanger our liberties or democratic
processes.'
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remarks made at the March 29-31, 2006 Virginia Environmental Law Journal Symposium,
The Next 25 Years: New Directions in Environmental Law. The author thanks her
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1 Farewell Address of President Eisenhower, quoted by Bob Herbert, Ike Saw It Coming, Op-Ed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at A19. Although Eisenhower was speaking about
the "conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry," id., his
comments are just as relevant to the coincidence of interests between the government and
regulated industries in the current climate of fear.
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INTRODUCTION

Without question, life in the United States has changed significantly since September 11, 2001. The attacks launched from within
the United States in broad daylight against non-military targets and
innocent civilians, followed by the intentional dispersal of the biological agent anthrax, ushered in an era of uncertainty and fear in
this country unlike any in recent memory.2 The visible manifestations of this fear are still with us - concrete barriers and the closing
of public spaces around public buildings, heightened security at airports and train stations subjecting people to invasive searches of
their persons and belongings, the sudden, seemingly random
appearance of fighter planes over major cities, previously benign
colors taking on a whole new and frightening appearance, and the
detention of persons who were our neighbors and, we thought, our
friends.
This is also a war unlike any other the United States has experienced. No nation-states are threatening our shores. Therefore, it
is unlikely that there will be a clear signal that the war is over as no
armistice will be signed. Instead, the country appears to be now
perpetually at war with "shadowy groups, often fluid in nature,
motivated by a distorted Islamist ideology and only sometimes in
2 Accounts of these events were widely reported in the news media during October and
November 2001, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. See, e.g., Jacques Steinberg, Students Gear Up, Again, for SAT After Anthrax Scare, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2001, at A12;
David Johnston, After a Scare Over Anthrax, Postal Offices Are to Reopen, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2003, at All; Anthrax Scare at Hospital a False Alarm, BOSTON GLOBE, July 5,
2003, at B5; Elizabeth Hume, Pain Reliever Crumbles in Mail, Sets Off Anthrax Scare,
SACRAMENTO BEE, June 27, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 10924527; Antibiotics Were
Overprescribed Amid Anthrax Scare, HEALTH DAY, Mar. 20, 2003, available at 2003
WLNR 12351314; Pervaiz Shallwani, Powder Terrified Women at Area Health Clinics: Witnesses Relate Their Fearof Anthrax After Receiving Letters, MORNING CALL, Nov. 21, 2003,
at B8; Judith Miller, U.S. Officials Report Renewed Fears Over Vulnerability to Anthrax
Attacks, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 28, 2003, at A10; TerroristsMay Be Targeting Queen Mary 2's First Voyage: Al-Qaeda ChatterMentions Liner, Two U.S. Sources Say,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 29, 2003, at A4; Enlisting School Bus Drivers to Keep an
Eye Out for Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, at 1; Nicholas D. Kristof, Terrorists in
Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at Al; Civilian Sales of Military Rifle Raise Concerns About Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at A16. See also John W. Whitehead &
Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Justice Department'sAnti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1084 nn.9-10 (2002); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Supreme
Court in Times of Hot and Cold War: Learning from the Sounds of Silence for a War on
Terrorism, 28 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 270, 271 (2003) (commenting on the fact that "working in an
office tower" or "opening the day's mail" can be "unnerving" and while this is "surely not
a violent overthrow of the republic," it is "just as surely a more pervasive, deeply troubling,
and insidious constraint on American freedom").
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association with established governments." 3 The methods and
weapons these groups use are "unconventional" and "intended to
disrupt civil society rather than conquer it with large-scale military
means." 4 In response to the horrors of that day, the country is
newly and fervently patriotic, and "the military is popular again."'5
The events of 9/11 have also brought into sharp focus a conflict
that this country has not witnessed since the Cold War: the clash
between the safety and continuation of the Republic and other values we hold dear, among them a healthy environment. That con6
flict is the subject of this article.
3 Jonathan D. Moreno, Symposium Article, Bioethics and the National Security State, 32
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 198, 204 (2004); see also John D. Becker, Book Note, National Security Law in the Post 9-11 World: A Survey of Recent Legal Materials,31 DENv. J. INT'L. L. &
POL'Y 629, 635-36 (2003) (saying that the "advent of non-state players, like terrorist networks.. . , and the continuing transformation of state players into market-states, and other
significant factors like technology, migration, and culture" mean that "the international
arena is in flux" and that national security issues will be on the "front pages" and "national
security law will remain at the forefront of our legal system").
4 Moreno, supra note 3, at 204. See also id. at 206 (saying "America is now threatened
less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and
armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.").
5 Nancye L. Bethurem, Environmental Destruction in the Name of National Security:
Will the Old ParadigmReturn in the Wake of September 11?, 8 HASlINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 109, 127 (2002) (describing the "amazing 'rush to patriotism"'); see also Julie
G. Yap, Note, Just Keep Swimming: Guiding Environmental Stewardship out of the Riptide
of National Security, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1289, 1308 (2004) (noting that an "increased
sense of patriotism and unified support for the military following September 11, 2001 created a chilling effect on the effectiveness of this public participation"). Stephen Dycus
gives as an example of this heightened patriotic rhetoric a comment by a Department of
Defense (DOD) official that:
[t]he Army has endeavored to take care of the 16.5 million acres America has
entrusted to us. But America also entrusts us with an even more precious
resource, her sons and daughters. We are committed to providing our soldiers
with the most realistic training possible, to ensure [that] they come home to
their families.
Stephen Dycus, Osama'sSubmarine:National Security and EnvironmentalProtectionAfter
9/11, 30 WM. & MARY ENvmL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 6 (2005).
6 Much has been written about how Congress and the Bush Administration have
responded to the events of 9/11 and the extent to which that response threatens basic civil
liberties. See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 2; Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2005);

Becker, supra note 3; Daniel Angel, Recent Development, United States of America v.
Usama Bin Laden: District Court Extends Application of Foreign Intelligence Exception, 10
TUL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 387 (2002). Legal scholars, however, have paid less critical attention to the impact of these initiatives on the laws that protect the environment. This is not
to say that that the topic has completely escaped the attention of scholars. See, e.g., Dycus,
supra note 5; Bethurem, supra note 5; Paul C. Kiamos, National Security and Wildlife Protection: Maintainingan Effective Balance, 8 ENVTL. L. 457 (2002). The topic also has drawn
significant student interest for notes and comments. See, e.g., Yap, supra note 5; Moreno,
supra note 3; Bridget Dorfman, Comment, Permission to Pollute: The United States Mili-
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Unavoidable conflicts between the requirements of environmental laws and protecting national security exist, although some like
Dycus believe that they are avoidable with proper planning and
foresight. 7 No one understands this situation better than the
military.
We face numerous challenges and adversaries that threaten
our way of life. The President has directed us to "be ready"
to face this challenge. To fulfill this directive, we must conduct comprehensive and realistic combat training - providing our sailors with the experience and proficiency to carry
out their missions. This requires appropriate use of our
training ranges and operating areas and testing weapons systems. The Navy has demonstrated stewardship of our natural resources. We will continue to promote the health of
lands entrusted to our care. We recognize the responsibility
to the nation in both these areas and seek your assistance in
balancing these ...requirements.8

tary, Environmental Damage, and Citizens' Constitutional Claims,6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 604
(2004).
7 See, e.g., STEPHEN Dycus, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 185 (1996)
(declaring that "with rare exceptions, we can maintain a strong, effective defense without
endangering the public health or destroying our natural resources."); see also Dycus, supra
note 5, at 54 (concluding that "if trade-offs are to be made, they ought to be the result of a
thorough analysis of the interests at stake, as well as a robust public discussion"); Lawrence
0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are Limitations on Personal and
Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105, 1165 (2003) (arguing that "by circumscribing the conditions under which agencies can exercise power, it is possible to permit
effective action while reigning in governmental excesses"); Martha Townsend, Military
Exemptions from Environmental Laws, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 65, 67 (2005) (stating
that "environmental protection and national security are not mutually exclusive [and that]
[elnvironmental laws are designed to protect the basic infrastructure that we all depend on
for survival"); Kiamos, supra note 6, at 518 (concluding that "[c]larified environmental
requirements [would] permit U.S. naval forces to train more effectively and to test weapons and sensors while maintaining protections for human health and the environment").
8 Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative: Testimony Before the Comm. on House
Resources, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Rear Admiral Robert T. Moeller, Deputy
Chief of Staff for operations, Plans and Policy, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Dep't of the Navy),
quoted in Natalie Barefoot-Watambwa, Comment, Who Is Encroaching Whom? The Balance Between Our Naval Security Needs and the Environment: The 2004 RRPI Provisions
as a Response to Encroachment Concerns, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 598 (2005). DOD
frequently cites as an example of such interference the fact that Marines, once while training at Camp Pendleton in Southern California, had to bus between various phases of the
exercise to avoid harming the endangered California gnatcatcher. Erin Truban, Comment,
Military Exemptions from Environmental Regulations: Unwarranted Special Treatment or
Necessary Relief.?, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 141 n.18 (2004).
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In time of war, the resolution of these conflicts may favor
national security over the environment. 9 According to Gostin, in a
constitutional democracy, however, "[t]he state acts at its lowest
level of legitimacy when the risk [of harm] is low and the means are
ill-suited to achieve legitimate ends."' 10 Even in high-risk situations, if "the means . . . exceed the scope of the threat," Gostin
suggests the government's actions will be "unacceptable."'" The
challenge is to find a workable balance in this new, and perhaps
unending, era of terror without undercutting the national defense
and the government's legitimacy. This article posits that the proper
balance has not been found, at least with respect to laws protecting
the environment and public health.
The first section of the article describes the ways in which pre-9/
11 environmental laws protected the country's national security

interests. To provide a broader context for understanding the more
narrowly focused changes to environmental laws after 9/11, the
article next briefly describes the USA PATRIOT Act and the fundamental changes it has made to basic civil liberties.12 The third
part of the article describes changes made to wildlife laws in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, and pending revisions to pollution
control laws, which have not moved as swiftly. This part of the
article also contains a discussion of modifications made to public
disclosure laws and policies, including those curtailing the release
9 As Dycus puts it, "the potential gravity of a wrong decision" when the threat is to our
national security usually means the environment will be "sacrificed," but the question is
"whether the threat of another terrorist attack justifies the permanent suspension of environmental protections that do not appear to have materially affected military readiness."
Dycus, supra note 5, at 5.
10 Gostin, supra note 7, at 1139.
11Id.

12 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Prior to 9/11, the
momentum was going the other way in Congress with respect to the military's compliance
with environmental laws. For example, The Military Environmental Responsibility Act,
which was introduced in 2001, but died in the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee
on Commercial and Administrative Law in mid-July of the same year, required DOD, the
Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and all armed forces
to be subject to environmental laws to the same extent as other individuals and entities. It
would have replaced all exemption clauses from the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the
Coastal Zone Management Act, EPRCA, the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) with a power to
grant 180-day exemptions. Extended exemptions would be possible through a subsequent
act of Congress. The bill's provisions, however, did not apply to the Safe Drinking Water
Act (SDWA) or the Solid Waste Disposal Act. It would have waived sovereign immunity
for all federal agencies and protected individual administrators from personal liability for
civil damages, although they could be held criminally liable. The Military Environmental
Responsibility Act, H.R. 2154, 107th Cong. (2001).
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of information to the public about environmental risks. The article
concludes by discussing why these initiatives should be of concern
and asks whether they are a necessary response to the perceived
terrorist threat to the country; a question made all the more urgent
by the fact that war now appears to be "continually on the horizon." 13 The article concludes that the military is using the "war on
terrorism" as a Trojan horse to get out from under thirty years of
constraining environmental laws it has never fully accepted.14
II.

NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTIONS UNDER EXISTING

ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS

Congress was aware of the tension between national security and
environmental protection when it drafted the basic environmental
laws. With the exception of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), these laws authorize the President to grant waivers to the
armed forces from environmental requirements if the waiver is "in
the paramount interest of the United States," or if it satisfies a similar standard. These waivers may only be granted for a specific
activity and for a specified length of time, and they are subject to
judicial review. Most require that the President inform Congress in
some way about the waivers he has granted. The key components
of these provisions are set forth below.
Under existing law, the President can exempt federal sources
and facilities 15 from compliance with the Clean Air Act (CAA) if it
is "in the paramount interest of the United States."16 These waivers are good for up to one year, and the President must notify Congress of their issuance. They cannot be applied to new sources, and
13 Colleen C. Karpinsky, A Whale of a Tale: The Sea of Controversy Surrounding the
Marine Mammal Protection Act and the U.S. Navy's Proposed Use of the SURTASS-LFA
Sonar System, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 389, 412 (2004).
14 Some scholars believe that the "line between protection of the environment and a
strong national defense may have shifted" back to the Cold War era. See Bethurem, supra
note 5, at 111. See also Gostin, supra note 7, at 1111-30 (finding the risk of a bioterrorist
event "sufficiently credible to warrant serious consideration of restricting personal and
proprietary freedoms" in some instances because biological weapons are "readily available, inexpensive to produce, more difficult to detect, and more efficient in [their] lethal
effects," and "non-state actors have expressed the interest, if not yet the unfettered ability,
to develop their own weapons").
15 Federal agencies are required to comply with the CAA "in the same manner, and to
the same extent as any nongovernmental entity." 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (2000). The statute
also specifically requires federal facilities "to comply with all permitting and record-keeping requirements, and to pay fees imposed by state and local regulatory programs."
Dycus, supra note 7, at 50.
16 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (2000).
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17
there are special waiver provisions for hazardous air pollutants.
The President can authorize the use of certain ozone depleting substances when doing so is consistent with the Montreal Protocol,
there are no adequate substitute substances, and the exemption is

' The President
"necessary to protect national security interests."18

can also issue regulations waiving CAA requirements for "any

weaponry, equipment, aircraft, vehicle, or other classes or categories of property owned or operated" by the armed forces (or any
state's National Guard), which are "uniquely military in nature."' 9
The EPA, acting under this authority, can exempt new motor vehicles and engines from the requirements of Title II for motor vehicles2" and from the Act's fleet vehicle program.2 1 "Tactical
vehicles" can receive a national security exemption from new vehicle and diesel fuel standards,2 2 and federally operated facilities that
sell alternative fuel can be closed to the public for the same reason." 3 The EPA's regulations also exempt from a conformity determination actions undertaken in response to an emergency.2 4 In
addition to the general regulatory exemptions, some DOD sites
contain specific exemptions from CAA requirements for national
emergency situations.
17 Id.
18 42

U.S.C. § 7671c(f) (2000). Regulation of ozone-depleting substances is "aimed particularly at the Defense Department and its contractors, which are the nation's largest
consumers of ozone depleting chemicals." Dycus, supra note 7, at 54.
19 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (2000). The President is only required to reconsider the need for
the vehicle-exemption regulations at three-year intervals. The waivers for executive
branch emission sources are good for one year, but may be extended.
20 42 U.S.C. § 7522(b)(1) (2000).
21 42 U.S.C. § 7588(e) (2000).
22 40 C.F.R. § 85.1708 (2005) (cited in Colonel E.G. Willard, Lieutenant Colonel Tom
Zimmerman & Lieutenant Colonel Eric Bee, Environmental Law and National Security:
Can Existing Exemptions in Environmental Laws Preserve DOD Trainingand Operational
Prerogatives Without86New Legislation?, 54 A.F.L. REV. 65, 71 (2004)).
23 42 U.S.C. § 75 (g) (2000).
24 40 C.F.R. § 51.852 (2006) (defining emergency as "a situation where extremely quick
action on the part of the Federal agencies involved is needed and where the timing of such
Federal activities makes it impractical to meet the requirements of the subpart" and listing
natural disasters, civil disturbances, and military mobilizations as examples of emergency
situations); id. § 51.853(d) & (e) (2006) (exempting emergency actions commenced within
six months of the emergency, or, after six months, when the agency makes a written determination that for a specified period, not to exceed another six months, it would be impractical to complete the conformity analysis and the actions cannot be delayed due to
overriding concerns of national security, among other things). According to Willard and
his co-authors, an emergency circumstance can include not only a response to terrorist acts,
but also to military mobilizations. Willard et al., supra note 22, at 71.
25 For example, the EPA included a national security exemption in its Title V permit for
its China Lake Naval Air Weapons Station. Willard et al., supra note 22, at 71 (citing
Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control District, Permit # V-1A, general condition 16).
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The Clean Water Act (CWA) also authorizes the President to
exempt otherwise regulated sources, including federal sources,
from the Act's requirements, if the action is "paramount to the
interest of the United States" and does not involve requirements
under the Act's provisions regulating new sources 26 or toxic pollutants.27 Like the CAA, waivers under the CWA are only good for
one year, but are renewable in one-year increments after that.28
Congress must be notified each January of waivers granted in the
preceding year. Also like under the CAA, the President can "issue
regulations exempting any weaponry, equipment, aircraft, vessels,
vehicles, or other classes or categories of property ... which are
owned or operated by the United States... and which are uniquely
military in nature '29 from the Act's requirements.
Upon a finding that a waiver is "necessary in the interest of
national defense," the President can waive compliance with the
requirements of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),3 ° the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 3 1 and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).32 The President can also grant
relief to federal agencies from the requirements of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) when doing so will be in the "paramount
The exemption reads, "[w]hen a national security emergency occurs, the resulting surge
conditions shall not be considered in determining compliance with the permit's terms." Id.
If the surge lasts longer than 30 days, then the Secretary of the Navy must approve the
exemptions continuation. Id.
26 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (2000).
27 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (2000). There is also an exemption for marine sanitation devices-. If
the Secretary of Defense finds that compliance "would not be in the interest of national
security," then vessels owned and operated by the United States do not have to comply
with the EPA regulations for marine sanitation devices. 33 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2000).
28 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2000).
29 Id. According to Willard and his co-authors, the President has never acted under this
authority. Willard et al., supra note 22, at 79. Cf Dycus, supra note 7, at 46 (saying "the
court observed that the President may waive compliance with the NPDES [permitting]
system without having to show that compliance otherwise would be impossible" (citing
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 982-3 (4th Cir. 1992))).
30 15 U.S.C. § 2621 (2000) (allowing the President to grant exemptions upon notification
in the Federal Register "unless that notification itself would be contrary to the interests of
national defense"). No report to Congress is required.
31 42 U.S.C. § 9620(j) (2000) (giving the President the power to exempt specific sites
from CERCLA requirements, including any requirements of the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), "to protect the national security interests of the
United States). The President must notify Congress within thirty days of granting an
exemption. Id.
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000). Although Congress has authorized an exemption to
EPCRA, the statute "on its face" does not apply to federal agencies. However, Executive
Order 13,148 applied EPCRA to federal agencies. See Willard et al., supra note 22, at 84.
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interest of national defense."3 3 The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) authorizes the President to seek a renewable one-year exemption from the Act's requirements upon a showing that it is "in the paramount interest of the United States to do
so."'34 Under RCRA, the President must report to Congress every
January on any exemptions he has granted and give the reasons for
each exemption. 35 Courts have compelled federal agencies to comply with RCRA's provisions unless they obtain a presidential
waiver.36 For example, the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada held that the Air Force could not circumvent
RCRA's permitting requirements by arguing that they did not
apply to it; rather, the court required the agency to obtain either a
permit or a Presidential exemption.3 7
The pollution control laws are not the only environmental statutes that authorize relief from their provisions for reasons of
national security or defense. For example, the United States
Department of Interior's Endangered Species Committee can
exempt DOD from the requirements of the ESA's jeopardy provisions, if the Secretary of Defense finds doing this is necessary for

33 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(h) (2000). These exemptions can be renewed.
34 33 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (2000). Lack of funds can be a basis for the exemption only if the
President requested such an appropriation, and Congress failed to make it available. Id.
RCRA has broad language requiring federal facilities to comply with "all Federal, State,
interstate, and local requirements, both substantive and procedural ... in the same manner, and to the same extent as any person is subject to such requirements." Id.
35 Id. TSCA requires that the Administrator keep a "written record of the basis upon
which such waiver was granted" and publish "a notice that the waiver was granted for
national defense purposes, unless, upon the request of the President, the Administrator
determines to omit such publication because the publication itself would be contrary to the
interests of national defense, in which event the Administrator shall submit notice thereof
to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives." 15
U.S.C. § 2621 (2000). CERCLA and EPCRA both require the President to notify Congress within 30 days of issuing an exemption for a specific site or facility for national security reasons. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(j)(1) (2000). The SDWA does not require that the President
report to Congress when he exempts federal facilities from the SDWA requirements when
it is in the "paramount interest of the United States to do so." 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(h)
(2000).
36 See, e.g., Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163, 1167 (E.D.
Tenn. 1984) (finding DOE's hazardous waste was subject to RCRA's permitting
requirements).
37 Doe v. Browner, 902 F. Supp. 1240, 1251-52 (D. Nev. 1995) (ordering the Air Force to
either get a presidential exemption or declassify an EPA inspection report and hazardous
waste inventory). See also Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998) (sustaining President Clinton's exemption from RCRA's public disclosure requirements of any
classified information to any unauthorized person).
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national security reasons. 38 For military installations, an Integrated
Natural Resource Management Plan (NRMP) under the Sikes
Act 39 may "substitute" for critical habitat designation under the

ESA,4° but protection of wildlife habitat under. an NRMP may not
cause a "net loss in the capability of military installation lands to
support the military mission of the installation"' 4 1 - a limitation that
does not appear in the ESA.
Three other laws offer the military flexibility for national security reasons. Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA),
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) can authorize the
incidental, unintentional take of small numbers of animals within a
specified geographical region for up to five years, if the take will
have only a negligible impact on the species or stock.42 The
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) provides that, even if a
federal court finds a proposed federal activity inconsistent with an
approved state coastal zone management plan, the President can
exempt the activity upon a finding that it is in "the paramount
interest of the United States" to do so. 43 Finally, the National His-

toric Preservation Act (NHPA) allows an agency head to waive all
NHPA responsibilities under "extraordinary circumstances" and
upon a finding of an
imminent threat of a major natural disaster or an imminent
threat to the national security such that emergency action is
necessary for the preservation of human life or property,
and that such emergency actions would be impeded if the
federal agency were to concurrently meet its historic preservation responsibilities under ... the Act.4 4
38 16 U.S.C. § 15360) (2000) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, the
Committee shall grant an exemption for any agency action if the Secretary of Defense
finds that such exemption is necessary for reasons of national security."). Interestingly, in
light of the military's complaints about the ESA, this provision has never been used.
39 16 U.S.C. § 670a (2000).
4o 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000).
41 16 U.S.C. § 670a(b)(1) (2000).
42 16 U.S.C. § 1371(5)(A)(i) & (ii) (2000).
43 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) (2000). This exemption was enacted in 1990, but as of early
in 2006, had never been used. DOE Environmental Policy and Guidance: Coastal Zone
Management Act and related legislation, http://homer.ornl.gov/nuclearsafety/nsea/oepa/
laws/czma.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
44 36 C.F.R. § 78.3(a) (2006), promulgated under 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(j) (2000) (directing
the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations under which the NHPA can be
waived in whole or part in response to a major natural disaster or threat to national
security).
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This waiver, called an "emergency 45undertakings" waiver, can last
for the duration of the emergency.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not contain a specific national security waiver of its requirement to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for "major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 46 - Despite that omission, the language of the Act offers federal agencies sufficient flexibility to prevent it from being a barrier
to the achievement of national security goals. For example, section
4331(b) (NEPA section 101(b)) provides that the government shall
"use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy" to comply with NEPA, and section 4332
(NEPA section 102) only requires that federal agencies conduct
environmental reviews "to the fullest extent possible." Furthermore, the national security exemption under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) will keep exempt information out of an EIS,4 7

and the Council on Environmental Quality can authorize exceptions to the EIS preparation requirements in emergency circumstances. 48 The federal agency seeking the relief need only consult
with the Council about alternative arrangements,49 which DOD did
during the buildup to the Persian Gulf War.5" Courts have gener45 36 C.F.R. § 78.3(b) (2006). The agency head must notify the Secretary of the Interior
within 12 days of the waiver action. 36 C.F.R. § 78.4(a) (2006). The Secretary can reject or
terminate the waiver. 36 C.F.R. § 78.5(a) (2006).
46 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C), 4334 (2000).
475 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (2000). See also Cary Ichter, Beyond Judicial Scrutiny: Military Compliance with NEPA, 18 GA. L. REV. 639, 657 (1984) (discussing the Supreme
Court's use of the national security exemption in Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 454 U.S.
139 (1981) to free the Navy from the requirement to prepare an EIS, and explaining that
classified information can be "withheld under both NEPA regulations governing public
disclosure and the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which is incorporated by reference into NEPA").
48 The waiver of normal NEPA procedures is limited to actions "necessary to control the
immediate impacts of the emergency." 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2005).
49 Id. See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139,
144-45 (1981) (holding the information concerning storage of nuclear weapons in
magazines was exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemption relating to national
defense); Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't v. Vest, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,335,
20,339-41 (D. Mass. 1991) (upholding the emergency provision when used to allow the Air
Force to bring flights into Westover Air Force Base to serve Persian Gulf operations during
Operation Desert Storm; CEQ certified the emergency and the Air Force committed to
preparing an EIS as soon as possible). The district court in Valley Citizens, quoting 42
U.S.C. § 4332, pointed out that NEPA only requires compliance "to the fullest extent possible." Id. at 20,337.
50 Letter from Colin McMillan, Assistant Sec'y of Def., to Michael Deland, CEO Chairman (Aug. 24, 1990) (requesting CEQ agree that DOD's activities in the United States
conducted in response to "Iraq's invasion of Kuwait," some of which "may result in
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ally been protective of the military when confronted with a conflict
between NEPA mandates and military needs.51
The definition of "agency" in the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) excludes "military authority exercised in the field in time of
war or in occupied territory. '5 2 This exclusion gives the armed
forces additional relief from the public disclosure requirements of
NEPA because the obligation to prepare an EIS falls on "all agencies of the Federal Government. ' 53 The exclusion may have the
added benefit for the military of blocking claims against it in certain situations since meeting the requirements of the APA is a prerequisite for individuals seeking judicial review under NEPA.5 4
While, to date, courts have "interpreted this clause narrowly" and
"have not given military departments much deference" when other
laws, like NEPA, are implicated," the circumstances of 9/11 and
the continual state of war may change that posture.
Finally, if the President declares that there is a national emergency, or if there is a declaration of war, the Secretary of Defense,
"without regard.to any other provision of law," can undertake military construction projects required to support the use of the armed
forces.56 President Bush invoked this authority on November 16,
57
2001 in Executive Order 13,235.

adverse environmental impacts," constituted an "emergency," and requesting the invocation of "alternative arrangements" under § 1506.11 of CEQ's regulations); Letter from
Michael Deland, CEQ Chairman to Colin McMillan, Assistant Sec'y of Def.(Aug. 28, 1990)
(concurring in the determination that DOD's "immediate and emerging activities in support of the President's directives in the Middle East," which would under other circumstances trigger NEPA analysis and documentation, constitute an "emergency situation"
under § 1506.11).
51 See, e.g., Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 142 (1981) (refusing to require the Navy to prepare
a "hypothetical" EIS before completing facilities that contained magazines capable of storing nuclear weapons, saying none would be required unless the Navy actually stored
nuclear weapons at the facility even though the Navy could neither admit nor deny, for
national security reasons, that it proposed to store nuclear weapons there).
52 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(G) (2000).
53 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
54 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) (authorizing courts to hear claims brought by individuals
who suffer a legal wrong from agency action); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000) (making final agency
actions judicially reviewable). See also Willard et al., supra note 22, at 80.
55 Willard et al., supra note 22, at 80 n.106 (citing Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1372
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding plaintiff's challenge to HHS "rulemaking that allowed military to
use investigational drugs was outside military authority exception")).
56 10 U.S.C. § 2808 (2000).
57 Exec. Order No. 13,235, 66 Fed. Reg. 58343 (Nov. 16, 2001) (invoking the emergency
construction authority, and making it available to the Secretary of Defense and all military
departments).
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The armed forces have never liked this system of Presidential
waivers. 8 The scope of these waivers is too narrow, and the time
limits placed on them are not compatible with many training activities.5 9 Since these waivers are intended for one-time use only, the
vast number of training exercises conducted on hundreds of military installations across the country makes them burdensome to
obtain.6 0 To the military, "training and operations are on-going
needs - not an emergency exception."'" DOD has asserted:
Although existing operations are a valuable hedge against
unexpected future emergencies, they cannot provide the
legal basis for the nation's everyday military readiness activities . ..
The Defense Department believes that it is unacceptable as
a matter of public policy for indispensable readiness activities to be unlawful under our environmental laws absent
repeated invocation of emergency authority - particularly
when narrow clarifications of the underlying regulatory statutes would enable us both to conduct essential activities and
protect the environment.6 2
58 For example, Dycus notes that "[f]or its part, DOE has admitted that throughout the
1980s it followed a deliberate policy of avoiding compliance [with RCRA] at its nuclear
weapons complex, and it instructed its contractors to do the same." Dycus, supra note 7,
at 63.
59 Willard et al. liken "the aggregate result of having to employ these exemptions on a
case-by-case basis ...[to] 'death by a thousand cuts."' Willard et al., supra note 22, at 87.
This is especially true because since 9/11, the military has experienced a "surge" in the
number of units required for combat operations on very short notice, increasing the need
to train these units in live action drills very quickly. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie,
191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 169 (D. D.C. 2002).
60 For example, Catharine Vogel states that DOD argued that the "usefulness of the
ESA exemption is limited because it only applies to individual military actions and not to
entire military range operations," and "[b]ecause of the evolving nature of military training, each exception would have very limited duration and benefit." Note, Military Readiness and Environmental Security - Can They Co-Exist?, 39 REAL PROP.PROB. & TR. J.
315, 347 (2005).
61 Willard et al., supra note 22, at 87. DOD noted when it submitted its 2003 Readiness
and Range Preservation Initiative that it "remains fully committed to high-quality environmental stewardship and the protection of natural resources on its lands." DOD, Readiness
and Range PreservationInitiative (2003), Overview, https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Library/Sustain/RRPI/Documents/overviewjf.doc.
62 Hearing of May 16, 2002 Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong.
(testimony of Deputy Under Sec'y of Def. (Readiness) Dr. Paul M. Mayberry and Deputy
under Sec'y of Def. (Installations and Environment) Raymond F. DuBois Jr.), quoted in
Willard et al., supra note 22, at 87-88; see also News Transcript, DOD, Roundtable on
Range and Readiness Preservation Initiative 5 (Apr. 6, 2004), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040406-0582.html
(stating that the DOD "is
really seeking clarification" of the laws to ensure they are not "applied beyond their original intent").
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Some waivers require the disclosure of information that the
armed forces would prefer remain confidential.63 The military also
worries that the standard "in the paramount interests of the United
States" might give courts an excuse to overturn the waiver once
granted.64 The military particularly chafes against the role that
courts play in adjudicating disputes with those who disagree with
its conclusions about the need for training activities or the resulting
impact on the environment. The armed forces worries that an
injunction could lead to the complete cessation of military training,
and "identifies as a priority 'protecting [its] ranges from harassment by litigation.'" 66 But, their fear of the courts is grossly exaggerated, as, is discussed later in this article, the judicial branch has
treated Presidential waivers with great deference since they lie
entirely within the President's discretion.67 DOD's paranoia about
a "wave of nationwide litigation" and resulting liability for the
Department seems to be equally unfounded.68
To the armed forces, laws that require the protection of wildlife
and the cleanup of unexploded ordnance "'introduce an unacceptable degree of artificiality' into training exercises by forcing the
military to 'work around' protected habitat and suspend activities
63For example, the courts have applied the waivers strictly, requiring that the waiver
must "be drafted carefully to ensure its scope reflects the underlying statutory authority
and encompasses all anticipated activities." Willard et al., supra note 22, at 70. See also P.
R. v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035, 1048-49 (D.P.R. 1981) (denying a waiver under RCRA
because the facility for which the Navy sought an exemption was not covered by the statute). This may mean that information is disclosed that the military prefer remain
confidential.
64 Caitlin Sislin, Exempting Department of Defense from FederalHazardousWaste Laws:
Resource Contaminationas "Range Preservation"?,32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 647, 677 (2005).
65 Id. at 660 (citirig News Transcript, supra note 62 (noting "DOD identifies as a priority
protecting [its] ranges from harassment by litigation."')).
66 Sislin, supra note 64, at 660 (quoting Marine Corps General Michael J. Williams' analogy of a military installation to a "tale of two cities" because military installations require
"numerous environmental compliance measures" like a medium-sized city, "but unlike a
civilian city, its primary purpose is sustain military readiness").
67 Sislin, supra note 64, at 677 (stating that "the only two courts to examine a determination of paramount interests have found discretion to not be an appropriate matter for judicial review"). See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
a determination of what is in the "paramount interest of the United States" is a matter
Congress explicitly left to the President's discretion); Colon v. Carter, 633 F.2d 964, 967
(1st Cir. 1980) (opining that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a determination more fully committed to discretion or less appropriate to review by a court" than the determination that the
paramount interest of the United States requires an exemption).
68 Sislin, supra note 64, at 679. Sislin points out that "one senior DOD official indicated
that litigation may result in improvements to readiness" and cites the closing of the Vieques firing range as an example of this because it spurred the "development of 'significant
alternatives' to traditional training techniques." Id. at 680.
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while fulfilling environmental compliance mandates. ' 69 They contend, not unreasonably, that urban development around their bases
has made them places of last resort for endangered and threatened
wildlife, placing an unfair burden on the armed forces to protect
habitat.70 However, unfortunately for the military, the defense
establishment (such as private contractors who manufacture military equipment and weapons, and produce ordnance, including
rocket fuel) - of which military installations are only one part - has

substantial land holdings and engages in activities that significantly
affect the environment. These factors make the military, and the
defense establishment as a whole, subject to the wide variety of
environmental laws currently in place. 7 '
As the foregoing discussion shows, existing laws contain substantial flexibility for the President to give the military relief from constraining environmental laws. The military's objections to that
system of presidential waivers seem somewhat suspect given that it
has rarely requested any waivers.72 It appears much more likely
that the armed forces' problem is with the underlying laws,7 3 which
they have never fully accepted as evidenced by the fact that they
sought much broader changes to those well before September 11.71
This raises the question addressed later in the article whether the
changes they seek in those laws, and in some instances have
already secured, are really warranted.
Id. at 659-60.
70 Barefoot-Watambwa, supra note 8, at 612-13.
71 The DOD owns thirty million very biodiverse acres. See News Transcript, supra note
62. Often the military, particularly the Navy, selects "picturesque" places to conduct their
training because, from a military perspective, those appeared to be the best places. Barefoot-Watambwa, supra note 8, at 591. Although it took twenty-seven years to evict the
Navy from its base at Kaho'olawe, Hawaii and twenty years from Vieques, Puerto Rico,
the protestors were ultimately successful. Id. at 591-97. The Navy had actually used Vieques for sixty years before the legal battles stopped that use. Id. at 594.
72 Dycus, supra note 5, at 49 (identifying only two instances where the military sought
relief from RCRA and none under CERCLA). Moreover, as Sislin points out, DOD has
never identified a single instance where environmental laws or their enforcement has
adversely affected military readiness. Sislin, supra note 64, at 678. "The few extraordinary
cases" that the military cites are "instances in which DOD did not sufficiently respond to
severe, long-term public health threats," requiring federal intervention. Id.
73 See infra text accompanying note 246.
74. See Dycus, supra note 5, at 1-2 (observing that "only a few months after the 9/11
terrorist attacks, the Pentagon announced" a fully-formed and "highly organized, multiyear campaign entitled the Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative"). The Bob
Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, 116
Stat. 2458, containing national security exemptions from the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
and the MMPA, was passed on December 2, 2002.
69
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However, before examining those changes to environmental
laws, it is helpful to widen the perspective on national securitydriven changes to non-environmental laws and policies brought
about by the USA PATRIOT Act. Placing the changes to environmental laws in the broader context of the USA PATRIOT Act
makes more comprehensible the speed with which Congress initially granted relief from environmental requirements and why so
little opposition was generated to those actions, and may also
explain the aggressiveness and persistence of the military in seeking even broader relief.
III.

NON-ENVIRONMENTAL NATIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVES -

THE

USA PATRIOT ACT

This Part of the article looks at the USA PATRIOT Act for the
limited purpose of seeing how the country's response to the "War
on Terror," like the Cold War before it, has broadened the powers
of the executive and national security institutions and altered the
military's mission from one of responding to particular situations to
anticipating threats before they occur.75 What is striking about
these initiatives is that the resulting "significant expansion of state
power"" initially occurred almost without objection.
Although President Bush vowed in the immediate aftermath of
the attacks on 9/11 that "we will not allow this enemy to win the
war by changing our way of life or restricting our freedoms,"'77 it
became quickly apparent that quite the reverse would happen.
And, while the original intent behind the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act,78 commonly known as the -USA
PATRIOT Act, may not have been to restrict civil liberties, "its

75 Moreno, supra note 3, at 206-07 (finding "striking similarities" between the Cold War
and the War on Terror, and saying only twice in recent history has the United States'
national security policy undergone such a radical change - once in response to the communist threat, and now in response to terrorism). Moreno also notes that in both cases "science was recognized as potentially playing a central role in providing an advantage to the
U.S. and its allies." Id. at 207.
76 Id. at 207.
77 After the Attacks; Bush's Remarks to Cabinet and Advisers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,

2001, at A16, quoted in Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1083.
78 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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unintended consequences ' 79 have been the opposite, as shown
below.8 0
The USA PATRIOT Act has substantially increased the government's surveillance and investigatory powers. For example, since
9/11, law enforcement officials can search homes and offices without prior notice, use roving wiretaps to eavesdrop on otherwise pri-

vate telephone conversations, 81 and monitor emails and computer
text messages, including privileged attorney-client communications. 82 The Act also expanded the scope of searches authorized
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),8 3 permit-

79 Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1083 (saying the Act's "unintended consequences threaten the fundamental constitutional rights of people who have absolutely no
involvement with terrorism").
80 The USA PATRIOT Act was preceded by a September 14, 2001 Proclamation
declaring a state of emergency and invoking important presidential powers including the
power to summon reserve troops and marshal military units. Proclamation No. 7463, 66
Fed. Reg. 48,199 (September 14, 2001). Although it took the USA PATRIOT Act only
three days from introduction to passage and signature, its subsequent reauthorization has
not been so smooth. Thomas (Library of Congress) legislative history shows that it was
introduced in the House on October 23, 2001 and was signed on October 26, 2001. H.R.
3162, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/. It passed the House 357-66
and the Senate 98-1. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732 (2002) (noting that no committee reports accompanied passage of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act). See also Congress
to Resume Consideration of PatriotAct, Habeas Stripping Proposals,30 CHAMPION 6, 6
(2006) (reporting that two weeks prior to the expiration of the USA PATRIOT Act, the
reauthorization bill was blocked by a filibuster because of sharp disagreements over several controversial measures, and that Congress was forced to pass a shorter, five-month
reauthorization); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, PostponingDebate, Congress Extends Terror Law 5
Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at Al; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Eric Lichtblau, Senators
Thwart Bush Bid to Renew Law on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES,. Dec. 17, 2005, at Al.
81 Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act amends FISA to allow wiretaps "against
unspecified persons, rather than specific communications providers," "without geographic
limitation" and expands the amount of time both wiretap warrants and physical search
warrants stay in effect. Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1105. The USA PATRIOT
Act also amends the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994), to give
the FBI authority to intercept wire, oral and electronic communications relating to terrorism and computer fraud and abuse offenses. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§§ 201-202, 115 Stat. 272, 278 (2001).
82 Former Attorney General John Ashcroft instituted this change by allowing the correspondence and private telephone conversations between all prisoners, not just those suspected of terrorism, and their counsel to be monitored upon certification by the Attorney
General that "reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an inmate may use communications with attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts of violence or terrorism."
Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1116. He did this by posting the rule in the Federal
Register on October 31, 2001, the day after it went into effect. Id. Even the American Bar
Association has condemned this rule as an infringement on the attorney-client privilege
and a suspect's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 1116-17.
83 Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act amends FISA to provide that foreign intelligence need only be a "significant purpose" (as opposed to the primary purpose) of the
electronic surveillance and warrants for physical searches of property, thus expanding the
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ting the FBI to seize business records and computer systems without notice and "gag" the company that was the subject of the
search from disclosing what happened to it.84 Additionally, law
85
enforcement officials can acquire "sneak and peek" warrants
more easily.86
The USA PATRIOT Act authorizes the Attorney General "to
investigate not only acts of terrorism, but most acts of violence
against public officers and property."87 The breadth of this investiauthority of law enforcement officials to launch investigations of citizens that "only tangentially touch on national security." Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1103. The USA
PATRIOT Act also adds "roving wiretaps" and secret surveillance of emails to the FISA
surveillance arsenal and expands the "duration for which a FISA warrant is valid." See
Rebecca A. Copeland, War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the
Lines of Intelligence Gatheringin Post-September11 America, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1920 (2004). See also Donald J. Musch, Civil Liberties and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, in 14 TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL & LOCAL CONTROL 266
(James Walsh ed., 2003) (noting that the USA PATRIOT Act attacks "key statutory concepts that are critical to providing appropriate limits and meaningful judicial supervision
over wiretapping and other intrusive electronic surveillance" that were put in place by
Congress in response to "a history of abuse by government agents who placed wiretaps and
other listening devices on political activists, journalists, rival political parties and candidates, and other innocent targets").
84 Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1100.
85 These types of warrants are referred to as "sneak and peek" warrants because they
give law enforcement officials the ability to search a dwelling or other area that would
normally be protected by the Fourth Amendment without notifying the owner and without
authorizing any seizures. A "sneak and peek" warrant is intended to supplement law
enforcement officials' information in a way that would enable them to obtain a normal
search and seizure warrant.
86 Section 213 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes law enforcement officials to delay
giving notice of any search of a dwelling, including after the search has been conducted, if
notice would have "an adverse effect." This means that a homeowner who has been the
subject of such a search may not discover that her computer disks or mail, for example,
have been seized until she is finally "informed [about the seizure] through a letter in the
mail weeks or even months later." Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1112. DOJ has
indicated that section 213 sneak and peek warrants had been used as of April 1, 2003.
Letter from Jamie E. Brown, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (May 13, 2003) (responding to questions by Rep. Conyers) (on file with The
George Washington Law Review) cited in Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of
the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1189 n.285 (2004).

87 Section 802 of the USA PATRIOT Act adds a new definition of "domestic terrorism," which includes activities that:
"(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended-(i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to effect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur
primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.".
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2000). In addition, section 808 of the Act amends the definition of
"federal crime of terrorism" to include nearly all acts that result in any federal crime of
violence. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2000). The Attorney General has "assured the Senate
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gative authority may cover "diverse domestic political groups...
accused of acts of intimidation or property damage such as Act Up,
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), Operation
Rescue, and the Vieques demonstrators." 88 The Administration
has also heightened its rhetoric against such groups.
Charges of "kangaroo courts" and "shredding the Constitution" give new meaning to the term, "the fog of war." We
need honest, reasoned debate; not fearmongering .... [T]o
those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost
liberty; my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve.
They give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to
America's friends. They encourage people of good will to
remain silent in the face of evil.89

Grand jury proceedings are no longer kept confidential to protect the privacy of those who appear before them, but can be disclosed to federal officials. 90 Non-citizens accused of acts of
terrorism have lost their right to grand jury indictment, 91 have had
that the U.S. government's definition of terrorism has, since 1983, included as terrorists
only 'those who perpetrate premeditated, politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets."' Testimony of Dec. 6, 2001 Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(written testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft), availableat http://www.justice.gov/
archive/ag/testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm [hereinafter Ashcroft Testimony], quoted in Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1100. Whitehead and
Aden note that, "[i]f that is true, it certainly begs the question of why the Bush Administration felt the need to redefine 'terrorism' to include a wide variety of domestic criminal
acts." Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1094.
88 Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1093. An example of this is the recent sentencing of an Earth Liberation Front member to twenty-two years in prison for burning three

SUVs. See Convicted Arsonist Finds Wide Support, SEATrLE

TIMES,

June 13, 2005, at B3.

Whitehead and Aden also point out that former Attorney General Ashcroft used inflammatory rhetoric against those who question the Administration's commitment to civil liberties, "labeling" critics as "'un-American' and 'unpatriotic."' Whitehead & Aden, supra
note 2 at 1100.
89 Ashcroft Testimony, supra note 87, quoted in Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at
1100.
90 Section 203(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act amends Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 to allow disclosure of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or foreign intelligence information to federal officials to "aid the official receiving the information in the
performance of his official duties." Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1109, n.171.
Grand jury proceedings have traditionally been secret in order to "[recognize] a compromise between the public interest in investigating crimes and limiting intrusions to privacy."
Risa Berkower, Note, Sliding Down a Slippery Slope? The Future Use of Administrative
Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2251, 2258 (2005).
91See Military Order Concerning Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (suspending the rights
of indictment, trial by jury, appellate relief, and habeas corpus for all non-citizens accused
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their access to counsel denied or obstructed,92 and are subject to
indefinite detention without due process.9 3 The law also amends
the Immigration and Nationality Act to bar entry of not only any
non-citizens who represent a foreign terrorist organization, but also
any non-citizens who are members of, support, or encourage others
to become members of, groups "whose public endorsement of acts
of terrorist activity . . . undermines the United States efforts to

reduce or eliminate terrorist activities." 94 Law enforcement officials can seize assets without due process, and the federal Privacy
Act was amended to allow disclosure of banking records for financial analysis.95 Educational 96 and library loan records must now be
disclosed to law enforcement officials.
The USA PATRIOT Act ushered in a "phalanx" of new measures to enhance the government's power to respond to the potential threat of terrorists. Some of these initiatives were well
publicized, others less so, often appearing in executive orders or

agency operating procedures. 97 The new measures reveal an
"unprecedented emphasis on preemptive military engagement as a
necessary tactic to root out terrorism before it can strike" and on
aggregating power in law enforcement officials. 98 A major probof aiding or abetting terrorists, and establishing military tribunals to try suspected
terrorists).
92 Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1117.
93 This result is quite problematic for immigrants because "Section 412 of the
[PATRIOT] Act requires the Attorney General to take into custody any alien whom he
certifies . . . he has reasonable grounds to believe is engaged in any other activity that
endangers the national security of the United States," and, under the immigration laws
"there is no statutory or constitutional authority to control the length of detention," leaving many immigrants in United States detention facilities or prisons without any prospect
of relief. Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1126-27.
94 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), 115 Stat. 272, 346 (2001).
95 Sections 355, 356, and 358, respectively, allow financial institutions to report on and
document "their suspicions" about "the involvement of current or former employees in
'potentially unlawful activity,"' require "security brokers and dealers to submit reports
documenting any suspicious activity or transactions," and allow law enforcement authorities to obtain and review "citizen financial information" to protect the country from "international terrorism." Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1131. The Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2000), has been amended to require the turning over of
credit reports to federal law enforcement officials who certify they have a need for this
information. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u-1681v.
96 Section 507 of the Act mandates the "automatic disclosure of educational records to
federal law enforcement authorities upon an ex parte court order based only upon certification that the education records may be relevant to an investigation of domestic or international terrorism." Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1132.
97 Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2 at 1087.
98 Moreno, supra note 3, at 204. See also DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS
FREE: WHY WE ARE LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 1 (forthcoming 2007) (unpublished'
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lem with all of this occurring during an undeclared "war" with no
clear end is that there may be no signal to return these lost civil
liberties, 99 let alone protections lost under environmental laws, to
which the article now turns.
Homeland security is not a temporary measure just to meet
one crisis. Many of the steps we have now been forced to
take will become permanent in American life. They
represent an understanding of the world as it is, and dangers
we must guard against perhaps for decades to come. I think
of it as the new normalcy.10 0
IV.

RELIEF FROM ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE LAWS

Clearly, one response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 has been a
significant erosion of basic civil liberties. 0 1 Congress has given
unprecedented power to the President and his law enforcement
agencies to wage this war against terror, and when not directly
given, the Administration has seized additional power without
objection. It should be no surprise, then, that the military has
sought, and largely received, permission from Congress to weaken
environmental and public disclosure laws as part of the arsenal of
"tools" it needs to fight this war. 10 2 It should also be no surprise
manuscript, on file with the author) (quoting President George W. Bush's June 1, 2002
commencement speech at West Point: "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will
have waited too long," and quoting John Ashcroft's Feb. 10, 2002 Speech to the Council on
Foreign Relations: "In order to fight and defeat terrorism, the Department of Justice has
added a new paradigm to that of prosecution - a paradigm of prevention." (emphasis in the
original)).
99 See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1085 (lamenting that "[t]he U.S. Constitution, if c6mpromised now, may never again be the same. In today's world, once civil liberties are fenced, they may never be freed, becoming captive to the warden of national
security.").
100 Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks to the Republican Governors Ass'n (Oct.
25, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011025.
html, quoted in COLE & LOBEL, supra note 98, at 24.
101 See also COLE & LOBEL, supra note 98, at 5 ("The administration's adoption of the
preventative paradigm has radical implications for the core values that we associate with
the rule of law, and has resulted in far-reaching sacrifices in basic commitments to equality,
transparency, fair procedures, clear rules, checks and balances, and basic human rights.").
102 See Truban, supra note 8, at 165 (quoting Congressman Weldon (R. Pa.) "We are
tying to do the right thing. We are also trying to protect our troops. We are also trying to
give some relief so our military personnel can be properly trained and equipped when they
are called upon to protect America."). In fact, there appears to have been only one House
floor debate on section 315 giving the military exemptions from environmental laws. Id. at
163 n.188 (citing 148 CONG. REC. H2249 (May 9, 2002)). The Stump Act was debated on
the Senate Floor for only seventy-five minutes. Id. at 169 n.235.
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that, in a war in which the overriding theme is prevention and not
reaction,'10 3 the government is not waiting until experience demonstrates that these laws are obstructing the war's successful administration before seizing the initiative to weaken them.
The military's principal approach to environmental laws has
been to seek significant legislative expansion of existing exemptions or the creation of new ones. Congress has also been complicit
in efforts by the Administration to drastically curtail, and in some
cases completely eliminate, the dissemination of information to the
public about environmental risks. While these initiatives can be
seen as preemptive to the extent that they seek relief before a
problem has been demonstrated, it is difficult to see how they are
truly directed at ferreting out terrorism "before it can strike." 104
A.

Exemptions from Environmental Laws
One of the primary thrusts of the new exemptions has been

directed at laws the military believes "encroach upon ' 10 5 military
training and operations - what it calls "military readiness. ' 10 6 The
103 See, e.g., Homeland Defense Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(Sept. 25, 2001) (written testimony of the Honorable John Ashcroft, Attorney General),
availableat http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=108&wit-id=42 (Americans "must
prevent first, prosecute second"), quoted in Whitehead & Aden, supra note 2, at 1087 n.22.
See also Chesney, supra note 6, at 27 (saying "the overriding priority of the Department [of
Justice] since 9/11 is to prevent attacks before they occur using all available tools"); BOB
WOODWARD,BUSH AT WAR 42 (2002) quoted in id. at 28 (reporting that former Attorney
General John Ashcroft said at a meeting of the National Security Council shortly after the
September 11 attacks that "[t]he chief mission of U.S. law enforcement . . . is to stop
another attack and apprehend any accomplices or terrorists before they hit us again. If we
can't bring them to trial, so be it.").
104 Moreno, supra note 3, at 204. Moreno raises the alarm that the increasing fear of
terror attacks and the need to have a scientific response when one occurs may make "commitments to human research protections ... seem less important." Id. at 205.
105 The military is using "encroachment" in two senses: the physical encroachment on
military lands by expanding urban populations and the intrusion of environmental regulations into military operations. Both increase the administrative burdens on the military,
potentially interfere with military readiness, and increase opportunities for litigation.
Barefoot-Watambwa, supra note 8, at 612-13.
106 See Encroachment: Hearings before the H. Gov't Affairs Comm., 10th Cong. (2001)
(including testimony from Commanders from all three branches of the military to examples where compliance with environmental laws was substantially impacting the ability of
the military to properly defend the United States). See also Letter from Ten Members of
the House of Representatives to Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def. (Oct. 5, 2001), cited in
U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, Environmental Law Division Notes: Pending Legislation Targets Military Environmental Compliance, 2001 ARMY L. 30 n.17 (2001) (outlining
their concerns with "encroachment" on military installments and examples where training
effectiveness has been sacrificed to "feel good environmentalism" without any scientific
support).
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position of the DOD is that "to be successful, soldiers must train"
and "[e]nvironmental regulations requiring the protection of natural habitat or the cleanup of unexploded ordnance would hamstring" the achievement of that objective. °7 Although there is
little to no "empirical evidence that environmental laws
encroached upon the use of training areas,"1 0 8 the DOD easily persuaded Congress, in the wake of 9/11, to attach riders to the 2004
and 2005 Defense Appropriation Acts' 0 9 as part of its "range readiness preservation initiative" (RRPI).110 These riders exempted the
military first from the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 11 and
then from the MMPA 1 2 and various provisions of the ESA,113 as
107See Townsend, supra note 7, at 66.
108 BARRY W.

HOMAN, GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY

APPROACH TO MANAGING

ENCROACHMENT

ON

OFFICE, MILITARY TRAINING:
TRAINING

RANGES

DOD

STILL EVOLVING

(2003) (comprising testimony before the S. Comm. on the Env't and Public Works) ("Even
though [military] officials ... have repeatedly cited encroachment as preventing the services from training to standards, [the DOD]'s primary readiness reporting system did not
reflect the extent to which encroachment was a problem. In fact it rarely cited training
range limitations at all."), quoted in Townsend, supra note 7, at 66.
109The Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, 117 Stat. 1392
(2003). For example, the Senate spent only seventy-five minutes debating the issue of military exemptions from the MBTA. See Truban, supra note 8, at 169 n.235. See also Yap,
supra note 5, at 1320 ("Congress's support of the military's desire for environmental noncompliance has remained strong in the years since September 11, 2001, and has resulted in
the enactment of virtually all of the DOD's environmental wishlist into law.").
110 Yap notes that the "shift in [the] legislature's policy set against the background of the
ever-present threat of terrorism ... illustrates a shift from the way the country had previously approached and balanced two complex and important concerns: national defense and
the environment." Yap, supra note 5, at 1293.
111 See Pub. L. No. 107-314, 116 Stat. 2458 § 315 (2002). Congress reacted to a district
court decision holding that the Navy's continued bombing of the Farallon de Medinilla
Island (a small uninhabited island north of Guam that is home to a wide variety of migratory bird species) without a permit and resulting in the knowing death of migratory birds,
violated the MBTA exemption for military readiness activities from the statute. See Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that the bombing urintentionally took migratory birds in violation of the MBTA); Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2002) (enjoining the Navy and the Air Force
from using the bombing range).
112 Similarly, the DOD won its exemption from the MMPA in response to another successful environmental lawsuit, this time enjoining the Navy's use of Low Frequency Active
(LFA) Sonar because of its impact on marine mammals. Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Evans, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
113 These amendments to § 4(b)(2) were included in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-136, 17 Stat. 1392 (2003). Section 4(b)(2) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to designate critical habitat only after taking into account economic
and other relevant impacts of the designation; an area can be excluded from critical habitat
if benefits of the exclusion outweigh the disadvantages, unless it would result in extinction.
See, e.g., Proposed Rules for Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 68 Fed. Reg. 20,228, 20,234,
20,237 (Apr. 24, 2003); Final Designation of Critical Habitat for Holocarphamacradenia
(Santa Cruz Tarplant), 67 Fed. Reg. 63968 (Oct. 16, 2002) (codified at 50 C.F.R. Part 17).
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described in more detail below. Immediate relief was sought from
these laws for reasons of national security and military readiness."1
The FY 2004 Defense Authorization Act substantially amended
the MBTA. 15 The amendments direct the Secretaries of Interior
and Defense to prescribe new regulations that allow for the incidental, unintentional take of migratory birds during combat training and testing of military equipment and weapons,116 which they
promptly did.117 The regulatory exemptions apply to defense contractors as well as the DOD."' However, the Secretary of Interior
must suspend the exemption for a particular activity if the activity
would not be compatible with one of the migratory bird treaties or
would result in "significant adverse effect on the sustainability of
the population" of a migratory bird species.119
Fresh from its success with the MBTA, the armed forces easily
persuaded Congress to make several critical changes to the
MMPA. Congress made these changes in response to the Navy's
desire120 to test the efficacy of Low Frequency Active Sonar at
114 For example, the DOD argued in Pirie that since 9/11 and the initiation of military
activities in Afghanistan, the island was an "irreplaceable asset in maintaining the combat
readiness of the United States military units," the availability of which for "immediate and
continuous use" was now "essential." Truban, supra note 8, at 144-45.
115 The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2003, Pub. L. No. 107314, 116 Stat. 2458 § 315 (2002) (exempting the military from section 2 of the MBTA
regarding incidental takings of migratory birds during military readiness activities). See
also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. England, 2003 WL 179848 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding the
Stump Act exempts military personnel from incidental take provisions of the MBTA).
116 The Stump Act created an immediate exemption from section 2 of the MBTA until
the Secretaries promulgated implementing regulations. The interim period ended upon the
Secretary of the Interior publishing a notice in the Federal Register stating that regulations
had been published, all legal challenges to the regulations "had been exhausted," and that
the regulations had taken effect. Truban, supra note 8, at 153-54. The Stump Act also
requires that all parties seeking judicial review of the regulations implementing section 315
of the Act must bring their actions in federal court within 120 days of publication in the
Federal Register. Any lawsuit challenging the substance of the regulations or the procedures under which they were issued filed after that date will be non-jurisdictional.
117 Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by Department of Defense, 69 Fed.
Reg. 31,074, 31,076-78 (June 2, 2004). For an analysis of section 315 of the Stump Act, see
Truban, supra note 8, at 151-56.
118 69 Fed. Reg. 31,074-31,085 (June 2, 2004) ("The take authorization provided by the
rule would apply to the Department of Defense military readiness activities, including
those implemented through the Department of Defense contractors and their agents.")
119 69 Fed. Reg. 31,082 (June 2, 2004). This latter finding can only be made after the
Secretary of Interior determines, in consultation with the Pentagon, that the DOD failed to
implement appropriate conservation measures that are economically feasible and do not
limit the effectiveness of military readiness.
120 See Dycus, supra note 5, at 36-37, 30, 34 (saying that changes to the definition of
"harassment" in the MMPA narrowing its scope appear "tailor-made" to cover the decision in Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1188-1189 (N.D. Cal.
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detecting a new category of very silent and difficult to detect submarines. 12 1 The amendments redefined the statutory term "harassment" to cover only military readiness activities that actually injure
or disturb marine mammals to such an extent that their behavioral

patterns are abandoned or significantly altered. 22 Congress also
removed existing restrictions on the size of the geographic area and
the number of individuals that can be covered by an incidental take
permit for military readiness activities. The law now directly allows
the Secretary of Defense to grant two-year, nonrenewable waivers
from the Act's restrictions for broad categories of activities in the
interest of national defense 23 where before only the President
could grant waivers under the MMPA. These amendments effectively erased the Act's "precautionary standard" and will enable
2003), in which the court held that the test of a "powerful new generation of active sonar
equipment" violated the MMPA).
121NMFS had issued a one-year incidental take permit for low-frequency sonar systems
in 70-75% of the world's oceans. 67 Fed. Reg. 46,712-13 (July 16,2002). Environmentalists
successfully challenged that permit in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans (I), 232
F. Supp. 2d 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans (II), 279 F.
Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (overturning the incidental take permit, but noting that the
restriction on low-frequency sonar systems was only applicable during peacetime and that
the Navy could use it unrestrictedly during wartimes). See also Daniel Inkelas, Note,
Security, Sound, and Cetaceans: Legal Challenges to Low Frequency Active Sonars Under
U.S. and International Environmental Law, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 207 (2005)
(describing the application of domestic and international environmental law to acoustic
pollution); Jon M. VanDyke, More Bad News for the Whales, 19-SUM NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 20 (2004) (describing the hurdles to securing an international remedy to protect
whales from the LFAS's adverse impact).
122 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 319,
117 Stat. 1392 (2003) ("Military Readiness and Marine Mammal Protection"), codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1362 (18)(A) & (B) (2000 & Supp. 2004) (expanding existing exemption by
redefining "harassment," an element of the prohibition against "taking," as it applies to the
military, so that instead of protecting marine mammals from any act that has "the potential
to injure.., or disturb a marine mammal ... by causing disruption of behavioral patterns,"
the military can now disturb marine mammals unless "behavior patterns are abandoned or
significantly altered."). According to Townsend, this "diluted harassment definition was in
effect during the multinational Rim of the Pacific training exercise held off the Hawaiian
island of Kauai in July 2004, where the use of the LFA sonar coincided with the beaching
of approximately 200 melon-head whales and the death of one infant whale." Townsend,
supra note 7, at 66 (citing Marc Kaufman, Sonar Used Before Whales Hit Shore; Navy
Changes Story but Still Denies Responsibility, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2004, at A03).
123 16 U.S.C. § 1371(f) (2000 & Supp. 2004). Prior to authorizing this exemption, the
Secretary of Defense must confer with the Secretary of Commerce or the Interior and
notify the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services and describe the exemptions
and the reasons for it. The statute also provides that the notice may be classified if the
Secretary of Defense determines that it is necessary for national security. Id.
§ 1371(f)(3)(A). The NMFS has determined that the sonar is important for national security purposes and has codified an incidental take exception for the United States Navy's
SURTASS LFA sonar program. 67 Fed. Reg. 46,712-89 (July 16, 2002) (codified at 50
C.F.R. § 216.180-216.191).
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the Navy "to destroy local populations of marine mammals,
outside of the eye of public notice. 1 14
Congress also made several changes to the ESA in the aftermath
of 9/11. Section 318 ("Military Readiness and Conservation of Protected Species") of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004 turned what had been a discretionary decision of the
Secretary under § 4(a)(3)(B) into a flat prohibition preventing the
Secretary from designating as critical habitat "any lands or other
geographical areas owned or controlled" by the DOD that are covered by an NRMP under the Sikes Act. 1.25 Although NRMP plans
are prepared in cooperation with the Fish & Wildlife Service,
unlike proposed critical habitat designations under the ESA, 2 6
they are not available for public comment, and the public has no
way of challenging the Secretary's decisions in the plan. 2 7 The

Secretary, for the first time, must now consider the "impact on
national security" when designating critical habitat under ESA section 4(b)(2) 1 28 on any type of land, and there can be no balancing
of interests under that section that would compromise the military
129
mission of an installation.
124 Barefoot-Watambwa, supra note 8, at 613-14. Barefoot-Watambwa finds this particularly distressing because she sees no connection between fighting the war on terror and
the MMPA's key provisions that the RRPI changes, and because there were other less
drastic alternatives available to the Navy that might have allowed them to "achieve the
goal of flexibility for the military." Id. at 614.
125 Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 318, 117 Stat. 1392 (2003). Sikes Act §101 requires the DOD
with the FWS to prepare an "integrated natural resources management plan" (INRMP) for
each military installation in the United States that contains "significant natural resources."
16 U.S.C. § 670a(a)(1)(B) (2000). Implementation of the new requirements are reflected
in Proposed Designation of Critical Habitat for Navarretia fossalis (spreading navarretia),
69 Fed. Reg. 60,110-21 (Oct. 7, 2004) and Proposed Designation of Critical Habitat for the
Pacific Coast Population of the Western Snowy Plover, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,608 & 75,633 (Dec.
17, 2004).
126 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (2000).
127 16 U.S.C. § 670a et seq. (2000). See also Gina Guy, Swords, Not Plowshares: The
Department of Defense as a FederalLand Manager, 26 Wyo. LAW. 20, 23 (2003) (noting
that while the Sikes Act contains "no specific requirement for public comment," the plans
are subject to § 102(2)(C) of NEPA, which requires an environmental assessment of their
impact).
128 With regard to the ESA amendment, the DOD contends that "with 25 million acres,
525 training ranges, and 300 endangered or threatened species under its control, protecting
habitat becomes so prohibitive that it inhibits the Army's ability to train soldiers." Townsend, supra note 7, at 66.
129 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2004) (declaring that DOD must still comply with § 9 (takings) and § 7(a)(2) (consultation) and go through the "God Squad" to get
exemption for takings). Oddly, for such an environmentally unfriendly piece of legislation,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 contains section 323 ("Public
Health Assessment of Exposure to Perchlorate") which requires the Secretary of Defense
to provide for: (1) an epidemiological study of exposure to perchlorate in drinking water;
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These changes to basic species protection laws have substantially
weakened them. The changes are permanent until a subsequent
Congress repeals them. Given the importance of military lands for
wildlife habitat and the impact of military activities on wildlife,
these changes are not insignificant.
The military has also aggressively and persistently sought to
replace the existing presidential waiver system under the nation's
pollution control laws with permanent exemptions. Its goal has
been to gain greater flexibility for conducting military readiness
activities and to reduce the burdens and unwieldiness of the
existing system. Specifically, as Dycus points out, the armed forces
would like to have a permanent, nationwide shield from RCRA's
"imminent and substantial endangerment" provision out of concern that the EPA or environmentalists might use this provision to
stop live-fire training on its military ranges.13 ° They would like to
have protection from any RCRA requirement that might force
them to clean up live-firing ranges, subject military waste disposal
and management practices to regulation,1 3 ' allow non-military
inspectors to observe the processes that generate hazardous waste,
and then open those inspection reports to public inspection. 132 The
armed forces want relief from any CERCLA requirement that
might otherwise make them clean up soil and groundwater at any
of their training ranges that have been contaminated by abandoned
ordnance. 133 They would like to remove their facilities from the
reach of state laws enforcing national ambient air quality standards
for stationary sources for as long as they can 134 to delay the nonattainment effects from the buildup of troops and equipment at various bases.
and (2) an independent review of the effects of perchlorate on the human endocrine system. This is especially interesting given that the EPA had shut down live-fire training at
Camp Edwards, under the SDWA, because unexploded ordnance and munitions were
found to have contaminated the only aquifer for Upper Cape Cod with perchlorate. See
Military Toxics Project, Environmental, Economic, and Cultural Impacts of Military Munitions and Ranges, http://www.miltoxproj.org/CM%20Fact%2OSheet.htm.
130 Dycus, supra note 5, at 45.
131 See id. at 45-46 (stating that the DOD's concern is that the provision will interrupt
live-fire training).
132 See Willard et al., supra note 22, at 67 (stating that 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) allows EPA
officials to inspect hazardous wastes sites). See, e.g., Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434 (D.
Nev. 1995); Doe v. Browner, 902 F. Supp. 1240 (D. Nev. 1995) (subjecting DOD to the
Act's public disclosure requirements in Section 3007b and requiring the agency to either
declassify the EPA's inspection report and inventory of hazardous wastes at the Air Force's
Groom Lake facility or get a presidential exemption under § 6961(a)).
133 Willard et al., supra note 22, at 67.
134 Townsend, supra note 7, at 67.
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With these goals in mind, for the past several years, DOD has
attempted to secure protection from various provisions of RCRA
and CERCLA, and the CAA. 13 5 While the DOD's efforts have not
yet been met with success,13 6 these measures are pending before

the 109th Congress and are likely to be pushed by the Administra137
tion in subsequent Congresses.
The DOD's proposed approach to those laws has been sweeping;
the antithesis of the approach of the presidential waiver system,
which is narrowly focused, time limited, and activity specific. For
example, the military has proposed defining "solid waste," in
RCRA and "release" of a hazardous substance in CERCLA to
exclude military munitions on all operational ranges. These
changes would allow untreated and uncontrolled munitions and
munitions-related contamination to remain on a training range for
38
as long as the range remained operational, i.e., indefinitely.
135 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000);
CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000). On April 4, 2006, Senator John Warner introduced
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007, which includes a provision that
would eliminate "military munitions" located on active ranges from the definition of "solid
waste" under RCRA and CERCLA. S. 2507, 109th Cong. § 314 (2006) ("Range
Management").
136 See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119
Stat. 3136 (2006), in which DOD tried and failed to gain exemptions from RCRA and
CERCLA. See also Sislin, supra note 64, at 662-70 (chronicling the failed attempts of
DOD to get relief from RCRA and CERCLA). In the Second Session of the 108th Congress, one of the most controversial issues regarding DOD environmental programs was
whether to provide further exemptions for military readiness activities from certain air
quality and hazardous waste cleanup requirements. See id. at 669 (saying that the House
hearings revealed the "extensive scope and controversial nature" of the proposed
exemptions).
137 DOD has attempted to get relief from the requirements of RCRA, CERCLA, and
the CAA since 2002. In January 2005, DOD proposed legislation again seeking exemptions from those three laws for fiscal year 2006. Sislin, supra note 64, at 649. Although,
these efforts failed to make it into either the final House authorization bill, H.R. 5122, or
into the Senate authorization bill which was brought to the floor in June, the fight seems
far from over. Linda Roeder, House, Senate Lawmakers Reject Efforts By Pentagon for
Environmental Law Changes, 37 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1054 (May 19, 2006). It is interesting
to contemplate why DOD's arguments about problems with the existing statutory exemptions, the "paralyzing effect of environmental litigation on military readiness," and the
"insignificance" of the policy changes that would be made should the amendments pass,
have only prevailed with respect to the laws protecting various species. Sislin, supra note
64, at 649.
138 See Sislin, supra note 64, at 667 (stating that the proposed amendments to RCRA in
the latest iteration of the RRPI "would have changed the definition of 'solid waste' to
affirmatively exclude 'military munitions,' including unexploded ordnance," that have been
dropped on the firing range and left there). RCRA would continue to cover munitions
that have been deposited offsite, or that have migrated there. Id. at 668. Similarly, the
proposed FY 2005 changes to CERCLA would have changed the definition of "release" to
exclude unexploded ordnance deposited on a firing range during their normal and
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Existing requirements would apply only to ordnance that has been
deposited outside the perimeter of an operational training range or
on an abandoned range.139 The EPA's ability to respond to
problems that develop on active firing ranges would be restricted
to those that cause an "imminent and substantial endangerment,"
and even then the agency could only use its more limited powers
under the SDWA14° or CERCLA. 41
The DOD argued that these proposed changes to existing law
would merely codify existing federal regulations under the Military
Munitions Rule (MMR). 42 The Department also contended that
the proposed amendments were not "major policy alterations 143
and would not present a significant risk to human health or the

environment.
Quite the contrary, if these amendments had been enacted, their
effect on human health and the environment would have been
enormous and would have represented a significant departure from
existing law. 144 For example, the proposed amendments to RCRA
expected uses, and which remain where they have been deposited. Id. at 667. Like
RCRA, CERCLA would still cover "military munitions [or their constituents] that migrate
or are deposited off an operational range, or that remain on the range" after its use has
been discontinued. Id. at 668. See generally id. at 667-70 (discussing in more detail the FY
2005 proposed exemptions to RCRA and CERCLA and their legislative travails).
139 See DOD, Fact Sheet: Military Live Fire Training and RCRA/CERCLA, https://
www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Library/Sustain/RRPI/Documents/RRPI-RCRA-CERCLA2004April.pdf (noting that RCRA and CERCLA do not apply to areas that are no
longer operational).
140 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2000).
141 See Dycus, supra note 5, at 47.
142 "Under the MMR when munitions are abandoned preceding disposal, removed from
storage for disposal, have deteriorated to the point of obsolescence, or are determined to
be solid waste by a military official," they fall within RCRA's requirements. Sislin, supra
note 64, at 666. But, if munitions are being used for their "intended purpose," i.e., being
fired or being used during training or research, "when they are destroyed during range
clearance operations," or are being reused or recycled, they are no longer abandoned and,
therefore, not susceptible to regulation under RCRA. Id. See id. at 665-68 (providing a
more detailed look at the MMR and DOD's proposed changes to it).
143 See Sislin, supra note 64, at 670 (saying "DOD claimed that the exemptions were
limited in scope, mere clarifications of existing rules governing the military's hazardous
waste responsibilities").
144 Sislin notes that the proposed amendments will result in "significant policy and definition changes" in existing laws, reduce opportunities for "government and public oversight of hazardous waste management on DOD lands," and permit "the continued
unregulated emissions of... hazardous contaminants into soil and groundwater at DOD
facilities," thus imperiling public health. Id. at 649-50. As recently as "2003, the EPA
opposed the proposed changes to RCRA and CERCLA saying that it would make "judicious" use of its authorities on active firing ranges as it has in the past and would consult
with the military "to minimize any disruption in military readiness." Dycus, supra note 5,
at 48-49 (citing EPA, EPA's Comments on DOD's FY 04 Legislative Proposals to the
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and CERCLA would have affected approximately 24 million acres
of land. 145 They were not limited to military readiness activities
and "could thus conceivably" have exempted any munitions or
unexploded ordnance from the regulatory reach of these laws, '"as
long as the munitions and ordnance were being put to their 'normal
and expected use.' ' ' 14 6 The proposed legislative changes to the
MMR "would [have] exempt[ed] most used munitions and munitions constituents from RCRA's cleanup protocols, if... [they] had
been 'deposited incident to their normal use."' 147 By including
"munitions constituents" for the first time under the MMR, the
exemption would have covered some very troublesome chemicals
like perchlorate and white phosphorous. 148 These contaminants
can "leach into soil or ground water beneath military firing ranges
and cause demonstrable harm to human health." 14 9
Limiting the circumstances in which regulators could investigate
and remediate contamination of soil and groundwater to situations
where the contamination has migrated offsite from an operational
range or where the range itself is no longer being used15 0 would
have substantially increased the difficulties and costs of remediation as well as health risks from exposure.1 5 1 Further, restricting
the EPA's ability to respond to "imminent and substantial endangerment" threats on active firing ranges to its authority under the
SDWA and CERCLA would have increased the risk to public
health and the environment because those laws have significant
limitations. 52
National Defense Authorization Act, at 9). The EPA also maintains that DOD's concerns
were largely addressed in the MMR, which shields firing ranges from RCRA's hazardous
waste provisions. Id.
145See Sislin, supra note 64, at 670 (stating that 24 million acres of land would have
qualified as "operational ranges").
146 Id.

at 671.

147Id. at 672- DOD claims that the changes to the MMR would apply only to operational ranges, but according to the Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004, an "operational range" is "a range that is under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of the Secretary
of Defense and (A) that is used for range activities or (B) althoughnot currently being used
for range activities, that is still considered by the Secretary to be a range and has not been
put to a new use that is incompatible with range activities." Id. at 670-71 (emphasis
added). Sislin points out that this "could include a range that has been defunct since World
War I, but that still contains used munitions deposits remaining after live-fire training." Id.
at 671.
148 Id. at 672.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 672-73.
151Id. at 674.
152See, e.g., id. at 675 (pointing out that DOD's reliance on the SDWA to protect public

health is misplaced because the Act is "fundamentally" not'a remedial statute and "applies

2007]

National Security and Environmental Laws

DOD has asked as well for three additional years to come into
compliance with CAA's conformity requirements. 1 53 This extension would be applied to each activity at the base and the base
itself, and could start anew for each new activity.' 5 4 The states
would also be given three additional years to accommodate the
new increases in pollution by offsetting or otherwise reducing
releases from other sources. 5 5 This delay is intended to enable the
armed forces "to deploy new weapons at various installations and
to move or 'realign' existing forces among the various bases without having to worry about the impacts on air quality.' 1 56 This
change would enable the military to transfer training operations to
areas with poor air quality and avoid any possibility of restrictions
on these operations because of the emissions that they might
produce. 5 7

These changes to the CAA are potentially quite serious.
Depending on how the military chooses to redistribute its forces
and equipment, a particular base could remain out of conformity
"indefinitely.' 58 There were no limits placed on the amount by
which releases from military readiness activities may exceed
national ambient air quality standards. 59 Dycus points out that the
"[e]ngines for virtually all new weapon systems will burn hotter,
and will, therefore, emit more nitrogen oxides."' 6 ° This means that
areas that are in nonattainment for nitrogen oxides, like southern
largely to public water systems ....
not to private water wells or agricultural irrigation,"
and would not cover any of the "over two hundred contaminants derived from military
munitions, including perchlorate," while pursuing remediation under CERCLA is
extremely cumbersome, resource intensive, and time consuming).
153 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c) (2000). DOD sought, as an inclusion in the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 2006, a three-year extension for military readiness activities to
come into compliance with a state implementation plan (SIP), which would start anew for
each new activity at a particular location. This relief would not only apply to the particular
military facility or activity, but to the state as well. This would allow states additional time
to accommodate or offset these emissions. See Dycus, supra note 5, at 51-52.
154Id. at 52.
155 Id. at 52.
156 Id. at 50-51.
157 See DOD, supra note 61, at 5 (stating that the exceptions to the CAA would have a
"strongly positive" impact on the environment because they would facilitate realignment
of units from closing bases, reducing the total number of DOD facilities and substantially
reducing aggregate, nationwide DOD emissions, while only "temporarily" authorizing less
than 0.5% of total emissions in air regions) (emphasis in original).
158 Dycus, supra note 5, at 52.
159 Id. DOD responds to this accusation by saying that the proposed amendments only
"temporarily" authorize military readiness activities to exceed national ambient air quality
standards and at a level that "typically" amounts to "less than 0.5% of total emissions in
each region." Id.
160 Id. at 51.
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California, and that are desirable locations for military buildups,
can expect to see their air quality worsen. 6 ' States, although
relieved for three years from having to institute temporary measures to offset these new emissions, will in reality be forced to
either shift the burden of complying with CAA standards to the
private sector or expose their populations to the health risks associated with high levels of air pollutants during the exemption
period. 62
B.

Constraining the Release of Public Information

Congress and the Administration have also waged a less visible,
but equally serious attack on the laws requiring public disclosure of
information in the government's possession and public participation in government decisionmaking. 163 Even though this assault
does not specifically target environmental laws, public disclosure of
information is critical to their effective implementation, especially
with regard to information about environmental risks. An
informed public can do a better job of protecting itself than an
uninformed one,"6 and can provide more useful and specific com161 See id. (noting that the military would like to deploy a new Joint Strike Fighter and
Marine Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle in southern California and have the flexibility to move fighter aircraft squadrons from closed bases to new locations without forcing
an area into nonattainment or increasing the seriousness of the nonattainment).
162 Even though states get temporary relief from having to bring nonattainment areas
into compliance or amend their SIPs, eventually, they will have to make adjustments unless
the military is able to reduce its level of emissions. Reflecting this concern, the Environmental Council of States wrote letters in April 2006 to the Chairmen of the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees, saying "[w]hile we are very supportive of our military's efforts and recognize the need to train and maintain military readiness, we do not
believe DOD has made a convincing case for the proposed changes to multiple environmental laws." Roeder, supra note 137 (quoting from the letters). The National Association of Attorneys General, the National Council of State Legislatures, the Association of
State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials, the National League of Cities, and
the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies also wrote letters expressing their opposition to the pending amendments. Id.
163 See generally Christina E. Wells, Symposium, Information Control in Times of Crisis:
The Tools of Repression, 30 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 451, 481 (2004) (discussing the "critical
infrastructure exemption," and expressing the concern of some critics that the provision
may allow criminal prosecution of government "whistleblowers"); Kristen Elizabeth Uhl,
Comment, The Freedom of Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing the Put~lic's Right to
Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 AM. U. L. Rav. 261,
278 (2003) (saying, "[t]he CIIA FOIA provision will shield from public view sensitive infrastructure data submitted voluntar[ily] to federal officials by critical infrastructure owners
and operators"). For a good overview of how the Critical Infrastructure Act and FOIA
intersect, see James W. Conrad, Protecting PrivateSecurity-Related Information from Disclosure by Government Agencies, 57 ADMIN. L. Rav. 715 (2005).
164 Professor Bradley Karkkainen observes that the dissemination of information
through the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) improves environmental regulation of toxic
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ments on agency initiatives and plans to protect the public, leading
16 5
to "more rational" and better-supported agency decisions.
Information disclosure "empower[s]" local citizens and communi1' 66
ties and "promote[s] democratic decision-making.'
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with
the power which knowledge gives167

An informed citizenry can also pressure industry (through, for
example, litigation, boycotts, and proxy initiatives) to comply with
environmental laws and reduce environmental and health risks, as
the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) has demonstrated since its
68
inception.1
Because of the effectiveness of an informed citizenry, nearly
all environmental laws require disclosure of information to the
public about releases of pollutants into the environment as well as
actions taken by federal agencies with respect to permits, land
management plans, and the protection of certain species,
fragile resources, and important habitats.169 Some laws, like
substances in three ways: (1) by lowering the "barriers" to acquisition of corporate information, communities can more easily verify or learn of environmental problems; (2) "by
strengthening the community's informational hand," TRI levels the negotiation playing
field with corporations; and (3) by requiring corporations to disclose such information,
plant managers become more aware of the environmental record of their firms, and
"thereby improve the information base upon which they make crucial decisions." Bradley
C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursorto a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 316-17 (2001).
165 Stephen M. Johnson, Terrorism, Security, and Environmental Protection, 29 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 107, 134 (2004).
166 Id.
167. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE COMPLETE
MADISON: His BASIC WRITINGS 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953), quoted in Johnson, supra
note 165, at 107.
168 During the first eight years after the TRI was implemented, the total amount of toxic
material released into the environment fell from 10.4 billion pounds in 1987 to 2.6 billion
pounds in 1995. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 377-78 (3d ed. 2000). Much of this large reduction in toxic releases
has been credited to the reporting requirement. See CMA Initiative Cuts Toxic Emissions
49 Percent Over Six Years, Official Says, 27 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 11 (May 3, 1996).
169 For example, applicants for Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits

under the CAA must gather continuous air quality monitoring data for a year prior to
application, which must then be made public at the time of application. 42 U.S.C.
.§7475(e)(2) (2000). Under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (2000), holders of National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits must disclose discharge monitoring
reports and other information submitted to environmental regulators (except on a showing
that such disclosure would "divulge methods or processes entitled to protection as trade
secrets"). EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000), requires disclosure of the type and amount
of toxic chemical spilled or released into the environment and the results of emergency
response efforts for facilities that: (1) are involved in manufacturing, (2) employ more than
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NEPA 170 and EPCRA, 171 have public disclosure of information at
their heart. Additionally, the APA requires that almost all agency
proceedings be held on the record, which is to be open to public
review, and that agency rulemaking initiatives be preceded by public notice and comment. 172 FOIA compels agencies to make certain documents available for public review,'173 and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act directs agencies to abstain from holding
secret proceedings. 174 More recently, Congress has sought to promote federal agency use of the Internet for public information purposes. For example, in 1996, Congress enacted the Information
Technology Management Reform Act 175 to ensure that government agencies used new technologies to improve access to public
information and public participation in government decisionmaking. 176 That same year, Congress also passed the Electronic Freedom of Information Act 177 to encourage agencies to use the
internet and new information collection and dissemination systems
and to protect as well as expand public access to these systems.
ten people, (3) manufacture or process more than 25,000 pounds or use more than 10,000
pounds of a listed toxic chemical during a year. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921(b), 6922 (2000),
requires generators, transporters, and treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities to
use a "manifest" system that tracks certain wastes from cradle to grave. CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9602(b), 9603(a), (d), 9604, 9607 (2000), requires a company to notify the EPA if
there is a release of a certain quantity of hazardous substances into the environment. This
information can be obtained from the EPA through FOIA. However, the public may be
unable to access information such as the size of the release or the parties involved. TSCA,
15 U.S.C. § 2607 (2000), requires manufacturers of chemical substances to notify the EPA
of their intent to manufacture or process a new chemical. Manufacturers, processors, and
distributors of chemicals are also required to report to the EPA information that "reasonably supports the conclusion that such substance or mixture presents a substantial risk of
injury to health or the environment." 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (2000). For a brief overview of
the public disclosure requirements under the major environmental statutes, see Miri Berlin, EnvironmentalAuditing: Enteringthe Eco-Information Highway, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
618, 626-33 (1998).
170 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
171 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11023 (2000).
172 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
173 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
174 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000). The Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b
(2000), also requires that all agency meetings be open to the public, except when the public
interest dictates otherwise.
175 Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 679 (1996). President Clinton issued an executive
order that same year on federal information technology, in essence implementing the statute. Exec. Order No. 13,011, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,657 (July 16, 1996).
176 Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 5125(b)(3), 110 Stat. 679 (1996) cited in Johnson, supra note
165, at 123 nn.71-72.
177 Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996) (amending various provisions of FOIA
clarifying that electronic data are "records" within the meaning of FOIA, among other
things). See Johnson, supra note 165, at 122 n.67.
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There is an obvious tension between the need to keep certain
information from the public for reasons of national security and
the public disclosure and public participation requirements of these
laws. However, as is the case with environmental laws, existing
public disclosure laws accommodate this tension and give the
armed forces considerable discretion to withhold confidential or
classified information, including during litigation. For example,
FOIA protects from disclosure information that the President has
determined by executive order should be kept secret "in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. '178 As noted previously,
this exemption applies to information that might otherwise be disclosed in environmental impact statements.179 Other disclosure
laws contain similar limitations. 180
The military has also successfully used the common law "state
secrets" privilege to protect security sensitive environmental data
during litigation challenging its actions.1 8 1 Recently, the government has used this privilege to dismiss such cases outright. 1812 Once
1785 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
179See supra text accompanying note 47.
180 See, e.g., the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1) (2000) (containing language similar to FOIA, § 552(b)(1)(A)); and the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 10(a)(2), 10(b), 10(d) (2000) (providing in § 10(a)(2) that meetings can
be closed to the public in the interest of national security, in § 10(b) subjecting public
availability of records to § 552 of FOIA, and in § 10(d) limiting openness of meetings to
constraints imposed by the Government in the Sunshine Act).
181 The state secrets privilege enables the government to deny discovery of military
secrets. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). Willard and his co-authors identify an additional privilege, the Totten Doctrine, under which contracts for secret services
can be "kept secret forever." Willard et al., supra note 22, at 86-87. Willard and his coauthors note that the privilege has the potential to be "even more powerful than the state
secrets privilege because it requires immediate dismissal of the case [by the court once
invoked] without the in camera review or disentanglement of the non-sensitive items." Id.
at 87.
182 For more recent use of the state secrets privilege by the government to actually dismiss lawsuits, see Neil A. Lewis, U.S., Citing State Secrets, Challenges Detainee Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2006, at A12 (describing the government's use of the state secrets privilege
as a basis for asking that "the case ... be dismissed at the outset," and saying that the state
secrets doctrine, until recently, was used to "prevent classified information from being
introduced in civil suits," but now is being used to "stop trials altogether"); Neil A. Lewis,
FederalJudge Dismisses Lawsuit By Man Held in Terror Program, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2006, at A21 (reporting that the United States District Court granted the government's
motion, even though the facts of the case had been "widely reported"). See also Dana
Priest, Secrecy Privilege Invoked in Fighting Ex-Detainee's Lawsuit, WASH. POST, May 13,

2006, at A3 ("For at least the fifth time in the past year, the Justice Department yesterday
invoked the once rarely cited state secrets privilege to argue that a lawsuit alleging government wrongdoing should be dismissed without an airing .. ");Reuters, U.S. Asks for Suit
Against AT&T to Be Dismissed, WASH. POST, May 14, 2006, at A8 (describing the govern-

ment's filing of a motion to intervene and dismiss a lawsuit brought by a civil liberties
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the state secrets privilege is deployed, it is absolute and immune to

any showing of necessity by the plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit, in
Kasza v. Browner,1 83 remarked that the state secrets privilege has
"constitutional underpinnings" and rejected out-of-hand plaintiffs'
argument that RCRA's presidential waiver constitutes the only
statutory exemption from the law's requirements. 184 Illustrating
the potential breadth of the privilege, Willard and his co-authors
point out that the appellate court in Kasza employed the "mosaic
theory" to justify withholding seemingly innocuous data, if, when
those data were analyzed, they could "result in the identification of
18 5

military operations and capabilities.

Despite the ability to withhold national security information
from public disclosure, Congress and the Administration have
taken several steps to constrain FOIA's applicability even more
and to make it more difficult for the public to get access to information under the Act. For example, Congress included provisions
in the Homeland Security Act1 86 exempting from FOIA critical

information voluntarily submitted to government agencies by prigroup alleging that AT&T "unlawful[ly] collaborat[ed] with the National Security Agency
in its surveillance program to intercept telephone and e-mail communications ... in the
United States"). See also Dycus, supra note 7, at 168 (citing Bareford v. General Dynamic
Corp., 973 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1992) (the district court dismissed a lawsuit brought by family members of Navy sailors who were killed during the Iraqi Exocet missile attack against
a defense contractor that had manufactured a missile defense system for the Navy on the
grounds that it "would very likely result in disclosure of sensitive information about the
design of the system")).
183 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998). Courts generally have an obligation to try to disentangle sensitive from non-sensitive information. Id. at 1166. According to Ichter, although
the Court in Weinberger v. CatholicAction, 454 U.S. 139 (1981), did not mention the state
secrets privilege, nonetheless, given the sources that the Court relies on as a basis for its
holding, placing military initiatives beyond the reach of NEPA "makes clear that it is
grounded in state secret privilege." Ichter, supra note 47, at 639, 670.
184 Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1167-68. See also Willard et al., supra note 22, at 85. (saying that
the state secrets privilege "may well be at the head of the list of common law privileges").
In Kasza, the privilege was supported by an unclassified declaration signed by the Secretary of the Air Force and other documents that were classified and filed with the court for
in camera review. See also Ichter, supra note 47, at 675 (saying that "[w]hen the privilege is
invoked to neutralize statutory schemes intended to guide government operations, courts
should carefully scrutinize both the use of such a privilege and the conflicting public policies involved").
185 Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1182.
186 6 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2000 & Supp.); see Critical Infrastructure Information Act of
2002 (CIIA), 6 U.S.C. §§ 131-134 (2000 & Supp.). "Critical infrastructure" includes "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual 'so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of these
matters."' Linda Roeder, Inspector General Says Ability of EPA To Respond to Terrorism
May Be Impaired, 37 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 966 (May 5, 2006).
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vate entities "regarding the security of critical infrastructure and
protected systems, analysis, warning, interdependency study, recovery, reconstitution, or other informational purpose."'18 7 Critical
infrastructure information is defined in the statute as information
not customarily in the public domain, which is related to the security of critical infrastructure or protected systems. In some cases
this definition would include information the public would have an
interest in, such as operational problems with these facilities and
repairs to them. 188 The legislation makes criminal the knowing use
or disclosure of that information, except in furtherance of an investigation or the prosecution of a criminal act, or when disclosure of
the information is to Congress or the Comptroller General.1 8 9 The
punishment for violating the law is a fine of not more than
$100,000190 and/or imprisonment for up to one year, as well as
removal from public office or employment.' 9 '
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002192 amends the SDWA 1 93 to exempt from dis187 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, § 204, 116 Stat. 2135 ("Information provided voluntarily by non-Federal entities or individuals that relates to infrastructure vulnerabilities or other vulnerabilities to terrorism and is or has been in the possession
of the Department shall not be subject to [FOIA]."). The term "'critical infrastructure
information' means information not customarily in the public domain and related to the
security of critical infrastructure or protected systems." 6 U.S.C. § 131(3) (2000 & Supp.).
"Protected system" is defined to include "any service, physical or computer-based system,
process, or procedure that directly or indirectly affects the viability of a facility of critical
infrastructure," including not only computers, but also "any ... communications network,"
"hardware," "software program, processing instructions, or information or data in transmission or storage" regardless of the means of transmission or storage. § 131(6).
188 Among other things, critical information includes information about: (a) actual,
potential, or threatened interference with, attack on, compromise of, or incapacitation of
critical infrastructure or protected systems by either physical or computer-based attack or
other similar. conduct; (b) the ability of any critical infrastructure or protected system to
resist such interference, including any planned or past assessment, projection, or estimate
of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure; and (c) any planned or past operational problem or solution regarding critical infrastructure or protected systems, including repair,
recovery, reconstruction, insurance, or continuity, to the extent it is related to such interference. § 131(3).
189 The legislation does not restrict individuals or the government from independently
obtaining information and does not apply to any information that is lawfully and properly
disclosed generally or broadly to the public.
190 The Critical Infrastructure Information Act (CIIA) states that an individual may be
fined under Title 18, which provides that an individual guilty of a Class A Misdemeanor
may be sentenced to up to one year in prison and a $100,000 fine. 6 U.S.C. § 133(f) (2000
& Supp.).
191 6 U.S.C. § 133(f) (2000 & Supp.). Interim final rules implementing the Critical Infrastructure Information Act were published on February 20, 2004. 69 Fed. Reg. 8,074-8,089.
192 Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
193 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2 (2000 & Supp.); Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 § 1434 (2002).
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closure under FOIA assessments made by water providers "to
determine their [facilities'] vulnerability to intentional acts that
could significantly harm public health. ' 194 These facility assessments, as well as any description of the use, storage, and handling
of various chemicals, cannot even be provided to state or local officials without the EPA's approval. While there have been various
measures introduced in recent congressional sessions to restore
FOIA, to date, none of them has even made it out of
Committee. 195
In the months following 9/11, the Administration issued three
internal memoranda further weakening FOIA's provisions. The
first of these, the Ashcroft Memorandum, advises agency heads
that "[a]ny discretionary decision to disclose information protected
under FOIA should only be made after full and deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial, and personal privacy inter1' 96
ests that could be implicated by disclosure of the information,'
and directs them to require that the public show a "need to know"
the information it seeks before it is disclosed. This latter requirement contrasts starkly with the original presumption of FOIA that
1 97
the public has a "right to know" most government information.
194 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2(a)(3) (2000 & Supp.).
195 See, e.g., Restore Open Government Act of 2005, HR. 2331, 109th Cong. (2005) (in
House Committee on Homeland Security since May 12, 2005) (revoking the Ashcroft and
Card Memoranda, and certain executive orders that limited access to presidential information, and requiring the publishing of the names of presidential interagency advisory committee members); Open Government Act of 2005, H.R. 867.IH & S. 294.1S, 109th Cong.
(2005) (referred to the House Committee on Government Reform and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security)
(strengthening FOIA's procedures by setting time limits for answers to FOIA requests,
establishing a system of identification numbers to track requests, and creating the Office of
Government Information Services to review administrative FOIA procedures); Restore
the Freedom of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 2331, 109th Cong. (2005) (referred to the
House Committee on Homeland Security) (amending the Homeland Security Act of 2002
to prohibit the withholding of voluntary records under the Critical Infrastructure Information Act only if (1) the provider of the information would not normally make such information available to the public, and (2) the record is designated as certified by the provider
as confidential and not customarily made available to the public).
196 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att'y General, to Heads of All Federal Dep'ts
and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum]. The Ashcroft Memorandum superceded the 1993 FOIA
Memorandum of former Attorney General Janet Reno and replaced Reno's "foreseeable
harm" test, which favored disclosure, with a "sound legal basis" test that favors nondisclosure. Bill Berkowitz, Working for Change, the Freedom of Information Center, October 11,
2002, http://foi.missouri.edu/federalfoia/foiactonropes.html.
197 Congress specifically stated that one of the purposes of FOIA is "to establish and
enable enforcement of the right of any person to obtain access to the records of [federal]
agencies, subject to statutory exemptions, for any public or private purpose." Pub. L. No.
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The second memorandum, the Card Memorandum, issued by
former White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, directs agencies
to withhold "sensitive but unclassified" data (i.e., data not automatically exempted from disclosure in response to FOIA
requests). 198 The Washington Post reported that the Pentagon
removed approximately 6,000 DOD documents from disclosure in
compliance with the Card Memorandum and lamented that now no
one "outside of government can verify that any of those documents
contained information that could help terrorists.' ' 199
The final memorandum, issued by Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, supplements the Card Memorandum. It broadly defines the term. "sensitive information," referred to in the Card Memorandum, as
"government information regarding weapons of mass 'destruction,
as well as other information that could be misused to harm the
security of our nation or threaten public safety." The memorandum directs that the disclosure to the public of sensitive, but
unclassified, information should be "carefully considered, on a
case-by-case basis," alongside the "benefits that result from the
open and efficient exchange of scientific, technical, and like
information. "200
104-231, § 2(a)(1), 11 Stat. 3048 (1996). FOIA does not require a requestor to show a
particular interest or need for the documents. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (2000).
198 Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Advisor to the President and Chief of Staff, to
Heads of Executive Dep'ts and Agencies (March 19, 2002), available at http://cio.doe.gov/
Documents/wh031902.html.
199 Mark Tapscott, Too Many Secrets, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at A25.
200 Memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting Dir. Information Security Oversight Office, to Dep'ts and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://cio.doe.gov/Documents/wh031902.html. In addition to the congressional and Administration initiatives
described above, the Bush Administration engaged in several other activities reflecting its
extreme sensitivity to public disclosure of information it deems potentially useful to terrorists. In October 2001, the Bush Administration reduced the number of congressional
officials allowed to attend intelligence briefings, allegedly because of leaks regarding
potential future terrorist attacks. Dana Milbank & Peter Slevin, Bush Edict on Briefings
Irks Hill: White House Stems Information Flow, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2001, at Al. Again,
in October of that year, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a memo providing for blanket closures of all immigration proceedings deemed to be of "special interest."
George Lardner Jr., Democrats Blast Orderon Tribunals: Senators Told Military Trials Fall
Under President's Power, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A22. Since October 2001, the
Bush Administration has steadfastly refused to reveal the names and identities of the people detained in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, until ordered to do so by
the Southern District of New York. See Susan Sachs, Traces of Terror: Detainees: U.S.
Defends the Withholding Of Jailed Immigrants' Names, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2002, at A01.
See also Neil A. Lewis, Threats and Responses: The Detainees: Secrecy Is Backed on 9/11
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at Al ("A sharply divided appeals court ruled today
that the Justice Department was within its rights when it refused to release the names of
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In spring of 2003, the Administration continued its assault on the
public disclosure of information in the government's possession by
amending President Clinton's executive order on national security
information. 0 ' President Bush's amendments to the Clinton order
expanded the government's leeway to designate material as classified for longer periods of time than the previous order 212 and
reclassified previously released information.20 3 The amended
order also broadened the government's ability to exempt certain
categories of information from automatic disclosure by requiring
that the government need only show that the information could
hurt national security, if released. It additionally removed several
provisions of the original order that were designed to protect
against excessive secrecy by requiring that information be disclosed
or classified at the lowest level of secrecy if there was any doubt
about the propriety of its classification.2 °4
more than 700 people arrested for immigration violations in connection with the Sept. 11
terrorist attacks."); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow Policy of Silence on 9/11 Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at Al ("Without comment, the court let stand a ruling by a
federal appeals court here that had accepted the Bush administration's rationale for refusing to disclose either the identities of those it arrested, most of whom have since been
deported for immigration violations unrelated to terrorism, or the circumstances of the
arrests."); Associated Press v. DOD, 395 F. Supp. 2d 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ordering DOD to
submit a questionnaire to each detainee regarding whether they wanted identifying information to be released to the Associated Press, which the court would then review to determine if it must be released under FOIA), reh'g denied, Associated Press v. DOD, 410 F.
Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (ordering DOD to provide the documents to the Associated
Press). In November 2001, the Bush Administration issued Executive Order No. 13,233, 66
Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 3. 2001), expanding the ability of sitting and incumbent presidents
to delay release of presidential records from the national archives. During the summer of
2002, the Bush administration also refused to reveal information regarding its implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act in response to congressional questions and only released
the information after Congress threatened to subpoena the information. See Jeffrey Rosen,
Liberty Wins-So Far: Bush Runs Into Checks and Balances in Demanding New Powers,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2002, at B1. Even then, the Administration asserted that much of
the material was classified. Also during the summer of 2002, the White House requested
that congressional officials produce documents and take lie detector tests to determine if
they had leaked information regarding the September 11 attacks. Dana Priest, FBI Leak
Probe Irks Lawmakers: Many Spurn Polygraph Requests on Issue of NSA's 9/11 Intercept,
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2002, at Al.
201 Exec. Order No. 12,958 (Classified National Security Information), 16 Fed. Reg.
19,825 (April 17, 1995).
202 Compare Exec. Order No. 13,292 § 1.5, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (Mar. 28, 2003) with
Exec. Order No. 12,958 § 1.6, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995).
203 Compare Exec. Order No. 13, 292 § 1.7(c), 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (Mar. 28, 2003) with
Exec. Order No. 12,958 § 1.6(c), 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995).
204 In October 2002, the Department of Justice announced a policy of aggressively
enforcing existing laws to prevent disclosures of classified information and suggested that a
new law criminalizing disclosures generally, not simply in the espionage context, might be
helpful. Letter from John Ashcroft, Att'y General, to Congress and the President (Oct.
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Almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, "government agencies began removing from their Web sites environmental, health, or
safety information they believed could, if disclosed, increase risks
to public safety.

'2 5

For example, the EPA removed from its Web

site emergency planning information for chemical facilities as well
as information about adverse effects from exposure to various airborne chemicals.20 6 The agency also limited the "public's ability to
search its Envirofacts database, which contains information about
pollution and environmental compliance" at regulated industrial
facilities. 20 7 Nearly overnight, the EPA went from being "a leader"
among federal agencies "in using the Internet as a public involvement tool" 20 8 to something considerably less exuberant. Similarly,

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission "removed a map of nuclear
reactors from its web site and temporarily 'disabled its entire Web
site,' ,,2 9 while the Department of Transportation "removed pipe-

line mapping information from its Web site," the United States
Geological Survey removed reports on water resources, and the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry removed a
report on chemical plant security.21 0
These measures restricting the public availability of information
are a "throw-back to the 1970s," when little information was available to the public about environmental risks.2"' They reverse what
was a pronounced trend before 9/11 "toward greater openness,
increased public participation, increased information disclosure,
and increased use of the Internet in federal and state government
decision-making generally, and in environmental decision-making
specifically.

' 212

They also carry on DOD's long-standing culture of

secrecy and record of keeping information hidden, even if disclo2002) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/otehrgov/dojleaks.html, cited in Wells, supra note
163, at 483, n.217.
205 Johnson, supra note 165, at 110; see also John D. Echeverria & Julie B. Kaplan, Poisonous Procedural"Reform": In Defense of Environmental Right-to-Know, 12 KAN. J.L. &
PuB. POL'Y 579, 596-98 (2003) (noting that "industry and its allies focused on the national
security issue with a great deal more intensity following September 11th,... encouraging
EPA to bar, at least temporarily, any public access" to information concerning the off-site

consequences of accidental releases of extremely hazardous materials and that states
including New Jersey and Pennsylvania also removed critical infrastructure information

from their agencies' Web sites).
206 Echeverria & Kaplan, supra note 205, at 597.
207 Johnson, supra note 165, at 110.

208
209
210
211
212

Johnson, supra note 165, at 123.
Johnson, supra note 165, at 110-11.
Echeverria & Kaplan, supra note 205, at 598.
Johnson, supra note 165, at 109.
Johnson, supra note 165, at 122.

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

146

[Vol. 25:105

sure would not threaten national security. 13 These changes in public disclosure laws not surprisingly parallel the pre-9/11 nonsecurity related efforts by some regulated industries to "limit disclosure of toxic release inventory data, under EPCRA," as well as
"information regarding 'violations discovered during environmental audits of those facilities.' "214
The substantive changes to environmental laws will make, or
have already made, substantial inroads into the effectiveness of
those laws. The new laws and policies discouraging, and in some
cases prohibiting, public disclosure of information about environmental risks and government activities under these laws will only
make these problems worse.
V.

THESE CHANGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC

DISCLOSURE LAWS ARE TROUBLING

The combination of an unhappy armed forces and a "selfdeclared," politically compelling "war against terror" has turned
out to be lethal, not only for civil liberties but also for the laws and
policies that protect the environment and the public's access to
critical information about environmental risks. This situation is
made worse by the breadth of the new authorizations and by the
lack of institutional checks on the armed forces to prevent them
from abusing their new authorities or causing serious environmen213 See Dycus, supra note 7, at 5. Dycus highlights a situation where residents downwind from the nuclear weapons plant at Los Alamos were not notified when radionuclides
were released into the air. Id. When the environmental engineer found that the lab oratory
was not complying with EPA regulations for air emissions of radionuclides, "his [DOE]
supervisors warned him to write only 'positive factual statements' about the laboratory's
radiation program in the future, then transferred him to other duties." The EPA only
learned of the emissions when the engineer "informally" contacted the agency with his
information. Id. at 52. Similarly, at the Rocky Flats site, DOE only admitted that
radionuclide contamination had gone off the plant site in 1967 after a group of independent scientists discovered plutonium in the soil outside the plant's boundaries in 1970. The
truth about the "sloppy production line practices and other problems at the plant" leading
up to the 1969 contamination were "well-concealed in secret documents" until the 1990s.
Len Ackland, The Press, "National Security," and Nuclear Weapons: Lessons from Rocky
Flats, 24 LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 17, 22-23 (2004). For a description of the process
piecing together the history of national security events, such as the experiments at Los
Alamos, see Robert W. Seidel, Clio and the Complex: Recent Historiography of Science
and NationalSecurity, 134 PROC. AM. PHIL. Soc'y 420, 421 (1990) (discussing the problems
historians face researching issues involving postwar science because of the "secrecy of scientific work related to national security concerns" and saying that the "lack of rigor and
substance in treating military technology may be due in part to the secrecy surrounding
it").
214 Johnson, supra note 165, at 115-16 (saying these initiatives were for "primarily economic," not national security reasons).
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tal harm. It will not be easy to restore the prior legal regime, and
the impact of military activities under the new laws may well be

irreversible.
There will be no external check on how the military administers
the exemptions detailed throughout this article. The courts have
traditionally played a limited role in reviewing the military's
actions, especially during wartime and when foreign policy and
presidential discretion are involved. 1 5 Since what Kmiec calls the
Court's "full-throated judicial endorsement '2 16 of military decisionmaking in times of war in Hirabayashi v. United States in
1943117 through the recent Fourth Circuit opinion in Hamdi v.

Rumsfeld, 18 the courts have been reluctant to curb the armed
forces.2 19 Kmiec notes that even during "colder periods" of war,
the judicial branch has been only slightly more vigorous in preserving certain civil liberties, such as free speech claims made against
classified information. 2 ° While it is still too soon to predict the
ability of the USA PATRIOT Act to withstand claims of civil liber215 See Kmiec, supra note 2, at 272. Kmiec describes Justice Frankfurter's ambivalence
in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944), about judicial review of military
action, saying "on the one hand" the Justice wrote that the "business of war was the military's," and, "on the other hand," that "review of military action is of no greater strain on
judicial capability than the Court determining whether Congress has stayed within the
Commerce power," which today it does quite regularly. Kmiec, supra note 2, at 278. See
also supra text accompanying note 49 (discussing Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't v. Vest).
216 Kmiec, supra note 2, at 272-73.
217 320 U.S. 81 (1943).

218 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002) (saying "allowing alleged combatants to call American commanders to account in federal courtrooms would stand the
warmaking powers of Articles I and II on their heads"), rev'd and remanded, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 527 (2004).
219 See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (illustrating courts' reluctance to
interfere in command relationships or in military decisions on training and equipping);
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding no justiciable controversy was presented in
an appeal by the Kent State student government against the Ohio National Guard's actions
in response to the 1970 civil demonstrations at Kent State), cited by Willard et al., supra
note 22, at 80. See also Dycus, supra note 7, at 156 (highlighting Wisconsin v. Weinberger,
745 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 1984) where the court found that even though there was no national
defense exemption to NEPA at that time, and the Navy had not even asserted such a
defense, environmental protection was outweighed by the larger interests of society in
national defense).
220 Kmiec, supra note 2, at 272 (saying that "the judiciary has, by conscious, institutional
choice, played little role during hot war and reserved its relatively rare attempts at constitutional boundary-keeping to post-war analysis. In cold war, there has been greater, but
still infrequent judicial involvement."). Kmiec goes on to opine that while "rights matter,"
they are "subject to diminution both by one's own government and by the terror that
threatens the continuation of one's government," and that "the Court's job is to keep a
jealous eye on both threats, or at least not to blind the executive from doing so." Id. at
294.
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ties violations, Kmiec sees deference to military decisions "in the

early judicial response to the war on terrorism. ' 221 Given the current Supreme Court's general hostility toward environmental
laws, 222 it may be easier to predict that the military will get the
benefit of the doubt in its implementation of these new environmental exemptions and will be able to justify the removal of critical
environmental information from public view. 223 Since courts usually defer to presidential determinations of what is in the "paramount interests of the United States, 212 4 there is no reason to
expect them to react differently to claims under the various amendments to FOLA or the new post 9/11 administrative measures.
No other institution is likely to have the power and impetus to

curb the military's excesses under the new exemptions. Widespread paranoia about future terrorist attacks, political polarization, and the Bush Administration's recent aggressive use of the
"unitary executive theory" make it highly unlikely that Congress
will provide any real check on the military.2 2 5 The proposed
221 Id. at 281. For an example of the danger of complete abdication to the military, see
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 217, 248 (1944) (J. Jackson, dissenting and objecting to
the Court's undertaking review of the matter) ("The military reasonableness of [military]
orders can only be determined by military superiors.... [Tihe courts wield no power equal
to its restraint."). See also Kmiec, supra note 2, at 272.
222 See generally Richard Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in the
Supreme Court, 19 PACE ENvrL. L. REV. 619, 620-21 & 631 (2002) (stating that in the

author's view, the Supreme Court decisions over the past thirty years demonstrate the
Court's lack of "appreciation of environmental law as a distinct area of law," and noting
the "increasingly ... disfavored role" of, and the Justices' skepticism about the efficacy of,
environmental protection goals in influencing the Court's outcome).
223 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318 (1982) (holding that the
existence of presidential exemption from the permitting requirements of the CWA does
not require the lower court to enjoin the Navy for an unpermitted discharge of ordnance,
and finding that the exemption specifically permits "noncompliance by federal agencies in
extraordinary circumstances"); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 982
(4th Cir. 1992) (finding that the "Executive branch possesses ultimate unilateral authority
to prevent any compromise to national security concerns," and finding that Court's holding
in Romero-Barcelo showed that a presidential exemption "could completely isolate a noncomplying federal facility from the purview of the courts"); Australians for Animals v.
Evans, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1128-29 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (deferring to NMFS' reasonable
judgment that sonar research on gray whales would cause no harm); Natural Res. Def.
Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139, 1189-92 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (saying "the Court
will not second guess the Navy's determination within its expertise that it needs to test and
train with LFA sonar in a variety of oceanic conditions," and refusing to enjoin all uses of
LFA sonar systems).
224 See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1173-74. (9th Cir. 1998).
225 The Administration has aggressively used an expanded version of this theory to claim
exclusive authority for actions that previously were considered to require congressional
concurrence. For example, after signing the "torture amendment" to the USA PATRIOT
Act, President Bush sent out an email "signing statement" to members of Congress stating
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changes to RCRA and CERCLA, if enacted, will prevent state and
federal government agencies from auditing military activity or
monitoring the impacts of those activities on the environment.2 2 6
The restrictions on the disclosure of information to the public will
prevent the press and environmental groups from effectively overseeing the armed forces' use of their newfound powers. And the
broader public cannot be expected to check the actions of the military as it has generally acquiesced in the much more visible loss of
civil liberties outlined in the early parts of this article, 2 7 and is
mostly unaware of how environmental laws have been, or may be,
weakened in the name of national security.
The idea of the armed forces being beyond the reach of meaningful judicial review is especially troubling because the military
228
will be granting itself relief from laws that have always vexed it.
that he would interpret the amendment "in a manner consistent with the constitutional
authority of the president to supervise the unitary executive branch and as commander in
chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on judicial power." Elisabeth
Bumiller, For President, FinalSay on a Bill Sometimes Comes After Signing, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2006, at Al; cf Bob Egelko, How Bush Sidesteps Intent of Congress: Instead of
Vetoing Bills, He Officially DisregardsPortions with which He Doesn't Agree, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 7, 2006, at Al (noting that after signing a military spending bill that
contained a much-fought-over provision banning cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment
of detainees, President Bush published a notice in the Federal Register asserting his right
to ignore the ban when necessary" to protect Americans from terrorists). See also John
Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1200 (explaining that during
war the country needs the strength of "a single hand" when making decisions that affect
the "strength of enemy forces, the morale of our troops, the gathering of intelligence about
the dispositions of the enemy, the construction of infrastructure that is crucial to military
operations, and the treatment of captured United States servicemen") (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982)); Stephen J.
Hedges & Mark Silva, Bush: No Laws Were Broken, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 2006, at Al
(reporting on the Bush administration's defense of the NSA's creation of a database of all
Americans' phone calls in the face of requests for Congressional oversight); Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws: President Cites Powers of His Office, BosToN
GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at Al (stating that Bush has asserted his power to set aside any
statute, including military rules, passed by Congress when it "conflicts with his interpretation of the Constitution" and that legal scholars have viewed the Bush administration's
assertions as a "concerted effort to expand his power at the expense of Congress, upsetting
the balance between the branches of government").
226 See Sislin, supra note 64, at 675 (noting that the "proposed exemptions would circumvent current governmental authority under RCRA and CERCLA to monitor DOD's
sampling and mitigation of toxic munitions waste," thus making DOD's regulation of perchlorate "essentially voluntary" under the SDWA).
227 See supra Part III.
228 Showing how easy it is to turn the military environmental clock backward, on March
9, 2005, DOD withdrew a 1996 directive indicating that the Department would integrate
environmental factors into its decisionmaking and do what it could to protect, preserve and
restore, as well as enhance, the quality of the environment, requiring instead only compliance with "applicable laws and DOD policies." Dycus, supra note 5, at 4 n.8 (quoting
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Self-regulation is problematic, even in the best of circumstances, 2 9
but here it is made worse by the military's long history of noncompliance with environmental laws. The DOD's recent efforts to
conserve habitat and protect species on military lands, as well as its
environmental research initiatives 230 and attempts to mitigate the
effects of toxic contaminants,231 while commendable, do not begin
to offset its record as one of the country's "worst polluters" and the
fact that military facilities and lands are among the most contaminated in the nation. 32 For example, 129 of the 177 federal facilities
on CERCLA's National Priorities List belong to DOD.2 3 3 Military
ranges are contaminated with chemicals that are known or possible

DOD Dir. No. 4715.1E, Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health
4.6 (Mar. 9,
2005)). Prior to the 1996 directive, in response to the 1989 arrest and conviction of three
civilian employees for violating RCRA's constraints on storing and disposing of hazardous
waste, then Secretary of Defense Cheney issued a memorandum setting quite a different
tone. His memorandum declared that the DOD will be the "[f]ederal leader in agency
compliance and protection. We must demonstrate commitment with accountability for
responding to the Nation's environmental agenda." Seth Shulman, Operation Restore
Earth: The U.S. Military Gets Ready to Clean Up After the Cold War, ENV'T, Mar.-Apr.
1993, at 38, cited in Barefoot-Watambwa, supra note 8, at 597; see also Kathleen H. Hicks
& Stephen Daggett, CRS Report: Department of Defense Environmental Programs:Background and Issues for Congress, n.1 (No. 96-218-F, Mar. 6, 1996), available at http://
www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/science/st-4.cfm (citing Shulman as a reference for Cheney memorandum). According to Dycus, the Cheney memorandum also said that "[t]o
choose between [the environment and national defense] is impossible in this real world of
serious defense threats and genuine environmental concerns" - it is "not an either/or proposition." Dycus, supra note 5, at 3.
229 See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 7, at 1163-64.
230 Sislin, supra note 64, at 650 (noting, in particular, DOD's contributions to NGOs like
the Nature Conservancy and the American Bird Conservancy, "to promote habitat restoration and species recovery on military lands"). Sislin also describes the military's response
to the SARA's establishment of the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, which
includes the Installation Restoration Program to "cleanup traditional industrial contaminants" found on military ranges, and the MMR Program "to address health and safety
hazards resulting from unexploded ordnance and munitions." Id. at 651-52.
231Sislin, supra note 64, at 652. Barefoot-Watambwa attributes "embarrassment" about
the 1989 arrest and conviction of three civilian employees for criminally violating RCRA,
including the illegal storage and disposal of hazardous waste, as "the single largest factor"
motivating DOD to incorporate environmental stewardship and compliance into its mission. Barefoot-Watambwa, supra note 8, at 597.
232 Sislin, supra note 64, at 652. See also Truban, supra note 8, at 166 n.205 (quoting
Rep. Dingell (D. Mich.) during debates on the Stump Act as saying that "the military bases
in this Nation are some of the most skunked up, defiled, and dirty places, contaminated
with hazardous waste, radioactivity and other things," and noting that the military "constantly seek[s] to get out from under environmental laws").
233 Sislin, supra note 64, at 652. DOD estimates that it will cost almost $30.2 billion to
clean up the contamination of the remaining 9,200 sites that it has not yet remediated. Id.
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human carcinogens, neurotoxins, and teratogens.234 The pending
exemptions, if enacted, will enable the military to add to that
inventory of abuse.
The language of the exemptions and proposed exemptions is
extremely broad 235 and vague, creating the potential that many
more activities may be swept into their protective coverage than
even Congress intended. Because the wildlife exemptions were
enacted as riders to appropriations bills, there was little or no floor
debate on them and, consequently, almost no limiting legislative
history. 236 As noted previously, the lack of meaningful legislative
standards in the amendments will hamper what judicial review of
military action does occur,23 7 creating a very real
risk of "mere con' 238
venience masquerading as military necessity.
The changes and proposed changes to environmental laws partially exempt the military permanently from the regulatory reach of
those laws. Unlike the prior system, under which the President
issued narrowly focused, temporary waivers on a case-by-case
basis, these legislative exemptions are for poorly defined, broad
classes or categories of activities and will last indefinitely. The fact
that the "war on terror" has no foreseeable end makes it highly
likely that these changes will become permanent.239 Since most of
234 Sislin, supra note 64, at 653-54. Sislin singles out perchlorate, a material used in
rocket fuel, as a toxic chemical of particular concern. Perchlorate contaminates groundwater and military manufacturing and test sites are primary contributors. Id. at 654-55.
235 The exemptions are also not restricted to DOD, but extend to military research laboratories and testing facilities, as well as to private contractors and consultants and their
facilities.
236 See Townsend, supra note 7, at 66 (commenting that the amendment to the MMPA
passed as most appropriation packages do - "without significant public awareness or congressional debate"); Rep. Rahall (D. W.Va.) objected to the fact that the Stump Act was
passed as a rider to a military appropriation bill, thus avoiding committee jurisdiction and
public debate.
237 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971) (holding
that courts cannot review agency action when there is "no law to apply"). See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 at 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The principle then lies about
like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of urgent need.... A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But, if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes
the doctrine of the Constitution.").
238 John S. Applegate, National Security and Environmental Protection: The Half-FullGlass, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 350, 364 (1999).
239 See ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, V. FORGING AMERICA'S NEW NOR-

MALCY: SECURING OUR HOMELAND, PRESERVING OUR LIBERTY 2 (2003) ("There will
never be an end point in America's readiness. Enemies will change tactics, citizens' attitudes about what adjustments in their lives they are willing to accept will evolve, and leaders will be confronted with legitimate competing priorities that will demand attention.").
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them were legislatively promulgated, as opposed to administratively promulgated, they can only be removed by a subsequent act
of Congress. Strong interests will develop a stake in the new policies, making it difficult to return to the days of environmentally
protective regulation and public oversight. The synchronicity of
governmental and industrial interests will make it particularly hard
to return to the prior regime.
Even if the exemptions are ever removed, their impact may be
irreversible. Species that are lost as a result of the abandonment of
the incidental take provisions in the MBTA and MMPA or curtailment of habitat protection programs are unrecoverable. Should
the proposed changes to RCRA and CERCLA become law, contaminated soil and groundwater will remain contaminated until the
contaminants leave the military reservation. At that point, it will
be extremely difficult and costly to clean up the contamination, and
the damage may already have been done. Military contaminants
are highly toxic and often create "highly unconventional environmental hazards," including "extremely corrosive and highly radioactive" liquid waste, unexploded ordnance, and "defoliant
production residue."240 More air and water pollution, particularly
in parts of the country already suffering from these problems, will
increase public health risks and eventually cause harm.
These are particularly perilous times for the nation, made even
more so by changes to basic constitutional and environmental protections. An atmosphere of fear affecting both Congress and the
public, a compliant judiciary faced with broad, amorphous standards, and a gag on information about covered activities mean
there will be little to no check on how the military implements
these new and proposed statutory exemptions. Given the military's status as environmental renegade rather than good citizen,
there is much to worry about, especially in light of the very real
possibility that these exemptions will be in effect for a very long
time, if not forever. The question remains, however, whether the
changes to environmental and public disclosure laws discussed in
this article are nonetheless warranted by circumstances.

240

Applegate, supra note 238, at 354-55.
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VI.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF SEPTEMBER 11 Do NOT
WARRANT A ROLLBACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LAWS

The 9/11 attacks may well have provided useful cover for the
military to return to a regulatory regime in which it felt more comfortable. 24 1 This is not to say that some tweaking of the existing
system of presidential waivers might not have been in order. However, empirical support is lacking for the military's claims that environmental laws are impeding military readiness and that disclosure
of information about environmental and public health risks may
undermine national security. Until such support is provided, the
broad changes that Congress and the Administration have made to
the laws, as well as those changes currently under consideration,
seem unwarranted. Instead, there seems to be ample support for
the proposition that the 9/11 attacks provided DOD with an opportunity that it seized to get relief from laws that it has resisted for
24 2
decades.
There are many reasons to doubt the genuineness of the armed
forces' repeated statements about the crucial importance of an
unfettered capacity to train and prepare soldiers for combat in
Afghanistan and Iraq and their demonization of environmental
regulations for impeding that effort.24 3 Prominent among those
241The 9/11 events have also provided useful cover for both an anti-environmental
Administration and for certain key members of Congress, like Rep. Richard Pombo, Chair
of the House Resources Committee, Rep. Billy Tauzin, Chair of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee, and Sen. James Inhofe, Chair of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, on whom the DOD has been relying to advance its agenda with
some expectation of success. Truban, supra note 8, at 141.
242 Barefoot-Watambwa, supra note 8, at 614 (saying "the military's encroachment
agenda attached itself to the momentum of September 11th couched in the necessity for
'military readiness"' and enabled it to "rid itself of environmental burdens that it ironically
claims forms a part of their every day experience and an essential part of their mission").
Barefoot-Watambwa points out how the Navy had already targeted the MMPA as a law
being used in a way that was far-removed from its original purpose of regulating commercial fishing's impact on marine mammals and was highly critical of its "precautionary
approach," vague legislative history on, and regulatory definitions of, key legislative terms,
"lack of quality data," and limited scientific information on issues of concern to the Navy,
like the acoustic impact of sonar on marine mammals. Id. at 600. The Navy particularly
complained about "buffer areas, restrictions on night-time operations, and prohibitions on
the use of explosives." Id.
243 Sislin, supra note 64, at 659 (citing Current Environmental Issues Affecting the DOD
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality and Subcomm. on Env't and Hazardous
Materials, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Brigadier Gen. Louis W. Weber), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/04212004hearingl252/DuBoisl935.htm).
But see Ctr.for Biological Diversity, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 169 (D.D.C. 2002) (talking about
the surge in military buildup activities since 9/11).
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reasons is- that the initiatives contained in the RRPI relieving the
military from compliance with three critically important wildlife
laws were under development before 9/11.244 Further, many of the
pollution control laws from which the armed forces have sought
relief have been in effect for over thirty years. With the exception
of an occasional lawsuit, these laws have not constrained the armed
forces.2 45 Furthermore, "no President has ever denied a request
from the military for exemptions from an environmental statute,"
and there appear to be no examples where pollution control laws
have actually, as opposed to theoretically, interfered with military
readiness activities.246 As Dycus points out, the military's initial
success in Afghanistan and Iraq was achieved under pre-9/11 training and weapons testing conditions. 47
Despite the lack of evidence that military readiness has actually
been compromised by environmental laws, the military's arguments have gained sufficient traction to get broad, perhaps permanent, relief from important wildlife laws, and it is unabashedly
seeking similar relief from basic pollution control laws by mounting
244 See Dan Myers & Everett Volk, "W" for War and Wedge? Environmental Enforcement and the Sacrifice of American Security - National and Environmental - To Complete
the Emergence of a New "Beltway" Governing Elite, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 41, 84 (2003)
(claiming that prior to September 11, 2001, an environmental public interest group learned
DOD "planned to seek broad exemptions of many federal environmental laws for military
readiness activities, all in the name of national security"); Barefoot-Watambwa, supra note
8, at 600 (commenting that the Navy, in December 2000, had developed a plan targeting
the MMPA).
245 See Sislin, supra note 64, at 658 (citing Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy
Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'ys of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (2003) ("In the vast majority
of the cases, we have demonstrated that we are able both to comply with environmental
requirements and to conduct necessary military training and testing."), available at http://
www.peer.org/docs/dod/wolfowitz memo.pdf); id. (citing Testimony Before the Sen. Comm.
on Env't and Public Works, 107th Cong. (2002) (Statement of former EPA Administrator
Christie Todd Whitman) ("[T]here is [no] training mission anywhere in the country that is
being held up or not taking place because of environmental protection regulation."), available at www.epa.gov/ocirpage/hearings/testimony/107 2002_2002/021302ctw.pdf). See also
Dycus, supra note 5, at 5-6 (Paradoxically, the way Wolfowitz suggested achieving the
"twin imperatives of producing the best-trained military force in the world and providing
the best environmental stewardship [was to] . . . adopt sweeping permanent exemptions
from compliance with some environmental laws, [rather than] relying on individual executive waivers based on case-by-case determinations of need.").
246 Sislin, supra note 64, at 649-50 (saying arguments about "the inadequacy of the
existing exemption structure, the paralyzing effect of environmental litigation on military
readiness, and the narrow scope of the exemptions ... tend to reflect unfounded concern
rather than grounded fact"). With respect to RCRA and CERCLA particularly, there was
sufficient flexibility under the MMR and the CERCLA national security exemption for the
military to meet national security needs without sacrificing environmental protection. Id.
at 650.
247 Dycus, supra note 5, at 9.
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the same arguments. The military's largely unmonitored activities
under these exemptions could be as, if not more, damaging to the
environment than what occurred on its bases before environmental
regulations took hold. In this time of "war," the military will be
able to self-regulate. Based on prior experience, it is reasonable to
assume that the courts will give the military substantial deference
in its use of these exemptions, and that neither the public nor Congress will display much interest in constraining military activities.
Because of the changes to public disclosure laws, much of what the
military does and the effects of those activities will be withheld
from public view.
These changes to environmental and public disclosure laws are
preemptive as they seek relief before any problem occurs, and thus
they fit within the broader national response to the events of 9/11.
However, it is difficult to see how any of them will prevent another
9/11 from occurring. It may be harsh to say, but not unreasonable
to conclude, that DOD "rode the wave of public insecurity of
' to rid itself of environmental
another terrorist attack"248
and public
disclosure burdens it has been chafing under for decades.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Gostin sets up a hierarchy of risk to try to understand when state
intervention in private matters to protect public health is justified.
He concludes that "well-targeted" state intervention in high-risk
situations is appropriate, but that intervention is inappropriate
when there is a "negligible risk," because in such situations it "violates basic tenets of liberalism" without "substantially advance[ing]
any collective interest in health and security. '249 For "moderate
risks," which present the difficult cases for risk regulators,25 ° Gostin proposes a "framework for balancing the goods of personal
freedom and public security. ' ' 251 This framework consists of "traditionally successful mechanisms, like the democratic process, checks
and balances, clear criteria for decisionmaking, and judicial procedures designed to control the abuse of power by governmental
agencies. '' 21 2 As the country appears at present to be in a time of
248 Barefoot-Watambwa, supra note 8, at 614.
249 Gostin, supra note 7, at 1139-40.
250 Id. at 1139.
251 Id. at 1159.
252 Id. at 1161.
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moderate risk,2 53 Gostin's framework offers a useful analytical
approach for evaluating the appropriateness of the government's
actions described in this article.
Not surprisingly, given current circumstances, all of the elements
of Gostin's framework are missing in the government's response to
the perceived risk of future terrorist actions with respect to environmental and public disclosure laws. The changes to basic laws
appeared as riders to appropriation bills or as internal Administration memoranda, and, as such they were made without public
debate, outside of the democratic process and the glare of media
attention. 4 Because the government has clamped down on the
release of information that would be critical to the public functioning as a check on potential abuses under these exemptions, because
it is highly unlikely that Congress will act as a corrective in the face
of questionable, even excessive action by the military, and because
courts give great deference to the military in time of war, there will
be no external check on how the military proceeds to balance environmental protection with the needs of national security. In all
that they do, the armed forces will be largely self-regulating, which,
if the past is prologue to the future, does not bode well for the
environment.

253 Most of the country appears to be at yellow, or at an elevated risk level, which is at
the middle of the spectrum. See Department of Homeland Security, Threats & Protection:
Advisory System, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29 (last visited Oct. 30,
2006).
254 See Gostin, supra note 7, at 1163 (stating that often "public health officials, outside

the gaze of the media and the political process, make choices covertly").

